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A fuzzy approach for handling uncertain preferences is developed within the paradigm of 
the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution and new advances in trust modeling and 
assessment are put forward for permitting decision makers (DMs) to decide with whom 
to cooperate and trust in order to move from a potential resolution to a more preferred 
one that is not attainable on an individual basis.  The applicability and the usefulness 
of the fuzzy preference and trust research for giving an enhanced strategic understanding 
about a dispute and its possible resolution are demonstrated by employing a realworld 
environmental conflict as well as two generic games that represent a wide range of real 
life encounters dealing with trust and cooperation dilemmas. 
  The introduction of the uncertain preference representation extends the 
applicability of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution to handle conflicts with missing 
or incomplete preference information. Assessing the presence of trust will help to 
compensate for the missing information and bridge the gap between a desired outcome 
and a feared betrayal. These advances in the areas of uncertain preferences and trust have 
potential applications in engineering decision making, electronic commerce, multiagent 
systems, international trade and many other areas where conflict is present.  
 In order to model a conflict, it is assumed that the decision makers, options, and 
the preferences of the decision makers over possible states are known. However, it is 
often the case that the preferences are not known for certain. This could be due to lack of 
information, impreciseness, or misinformation intentionally supplied by a competitor. 
Fuzzy logic is applied to handle this type of information. In particular, it allows a 
decision maker to express preferences using linguistic terms rather than exact values. It 
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also makes use of data intervals rather than crisp values which could accommodate minor 
shifts in values without drastically changing the overall results. The four solution 
concepts of Nash, general metarationality, symmetric metarationality, and sequential 
stability for determining stability and potential resolutions to a conflict, are extended to 
accommodate the new fuzzy preference representation. The newly proposed solution 
concepts are designed to work for two and more than two decision maker cases. 
Hypothetical and real life conflicts are used to demonstrate the applicability of this newly 
proposed procedure. 
 Upon reaching a conflict resolution, it might be in the best interests of some of the 
decision makers to cooperate and form a coalition to move from the current resolution to 
a better one that is not achievable on an individual basis. This may require moving to an 
intermediate state or states which may be less preferred by some of the coalition members 
while being more preferred by others compared to the original or the final state. When the 
move is irreversible, which is the case in most real life situations, this requires the 
existence of a minimum level of trust to remove any fears of betrayal. The development 
of trust modeling and assessment techniques, allows decision makers to decide with 
whom to cooperate and trust. Illustrative examples are developed to show how this 
modeling works in practice. 
 The new theoretical developments presented in this research enhance the 
applicability of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution. The proposed trust modeling 
allows a reasonable way of analyzing and predicting the formation of coalitions in 
conflict analysis and cooperative game theory. It also opens doors for further research 
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1.1 Conflicts, Trust and Uncertainty 
Conflicts were and will always be an integral part of human interactions. Conflicts are 
triggered by the decisions one makes and the actions one takes. Conflicts are usually 
ignited by a clash of interests (Fraser and Hipel, 1994, Hipel 2001). Those decisions 
could range from daily life decisions to decisions that could change history for decades. 
When American President, George W. Bush, decided to invade Iraq in the year 2003 
against the advice of countries such as Canada and France, the most pessimistic member 
of the American administration did not predict the resulting catastrophic outcomes which 
are taking place in Iraq right now.  This in part is due to lack of credible information and 
in part to the absence of trust between the American and the different local Iraqi groups. 
 In order to make realistic decisions in conflicting situations, formal conflict 
analysis tools and solution concepts are needed to “assist in the understanding, modeling, 
and analysis of conflict” (Fang et al., 1993). Conflict analysis techniques are known and 
widely accepted procedures for resolving conflicts arising in areas such as engineering, 
economics, and politics (Bennett, 1995; Binmore, 1992; Brams, 1994; Fang et al., 1993; 
Osborne, 2003). 
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 It is important to realize that modeling, in general, is a mathematical 
representation that tries to capture the key characteristics of real life problems. Accurate 
representation may result in an added system complexity while too much simplicity may 
fail to capture some of the key components of the system or problem under study. A 
compromise between these two conflicting criteria is required to model, analyze, and 
predict a realistic resolution in accordance with the principle of Occam’s Razor (Hipel 
and McLeod, 1994). 
 
1.2 Traditional Approaches to Conflict Resolution and 
Coalition Analysis 
In order to better comprehend, model and analyze conflicts, a number of methodologies 
have been proposed. Among, but not limited to, those methodologies, are the graph 
model for conflict resolution (Fang et al.,1993), conflict analysis (Fraser and Hipel, 
1984), theory of moves (Brams, 1994), theory of fuzzy moves (Kandel and Zhang, 1998; 
Li et al., 2001), drama theory (Bennett and Howard, 1996; Bennett, 1998; Bryant, 2003; 
Howard, 1999; Howard et al., 1992; Howard, 1999; Howard, 1994), hypergame analysis 
(Bennett, 1977, 1980; Wang et al., 1988), and metagame analysis (Howard, 1971).  
The common dominator among all of them is that they are based on game 
theoretic approaches. These approaches “have game-theoretic roots – all are essentially 
game theory variants that have been designed to yield better decision advice or more 
compelling structural insights.” (Kilgour, 1995). The publication of the book entitled The 
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) laid 
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the foundations for the modern development of game theory. It was not until 1950 when 
John Nash introduced the concept of Nash stability (Nash, 1950, 1951) in game theory, 
for which he was awarded the Nobel Prize in economics in the year 1994, that game 
theory started to increase in importance.  
In the modeling stage, the key decision makers (DMs), sometimes referred to as 
players, participants, or stakeholders, the options or course of actions available to each 
DM, and the relative preferences of each DM over the set of feasible states need to be 
identified.  The analysis stage is a systematic strategic assessment of the conflict using 
the available information about the DMs, options, and preferences. A predicted resolution 
or equilibria refers to a state which is stable for all DMs. To answer the what-if questions 
and tests the model’s response to changes in the model’s parameters, sensitivity analyses 
are employed. Changes in DMs, feasible states, preferences, or any combination of the 
three could be used as a tool to check the robustness of the model. In most cases, the 
output of a robust model wouldn’t change significantly from minor changes in the 
parameters. For the situation in which a minor change in the parameters results in a 
drastic shift in the analytical results, the analyst needs to revisit the model and adjust and 
fine-tune the underlying assumptions. 
Conflicts can be represented as games or “a model of interacting DMs” (Osborne, 
2003). These games can be classified as cooperative or non-cooperative games where the 
available courses of action for each DM is referred to as his or her strategy. The 
combination of the selected strategies by each player are referred to as outcomes or 
states. Among the simplest and most intuitive approaches for analyzing conflicts is the 
Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (Fang et al., 1993). 
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1.3 Stability Analysis 
To be able to assess the stability of a specific state for a specific DM, the 
preferences of that DM over the set of feasible states or the available course of actions, 
need to be identified using cardinal values or ordinal preferences. Cardinal values 
(Fishburn, 1988) could be utilized using some utility values (Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1953). When using cardinal values, one is actually using real numbers that 
reflect both the preference and the strength of the preference. On the other hand, using 
the ordinal preferences only reflects the preference but does not tell anything about the 
preference’s strength. In both cases, when the decision maker is unable to express a 
preference due to lack of information or uncertainties, the states are said to be equally 
preferred. Transitivity is assumed in both cardinal payoffs and ordinal preferences. By 
that, one means that if a decision maker prefers state p to state q and state q to state r that 
implies that state p is preferred to state r by the same decision maker.    
In situations where transitivity is not assumed, one can compare the states in a 
pairwise fashion. A decision maker may prefer state p to state q and state q to state r but 
at the same time prefer state r to state p. A decision maker may prefer one state over 
another or may not have a preference among some states. In this case, the states are said 
to be equally preferred (Fang et al., 1993). 
There are some situations where the DM’s preferences could be expressed in a 
vague or imprecise fashion due to a lack of information. Several attempts have been put 
forward to handle preference’s uncertainties within the paradigm of conflict analysis. The 
information gap model is a way to bridge the uncertainty in preference information based 
on the known preferences (Ben-Haim and Hipel, 2002). Other attempts included 
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specifying the minimum required preference information to ensure stable equilibria using 
robustness analysis (Sakakibara et al., 2002). Li et al. (2004) introduced a new uncertain 
binary relationship for expressing a DM’s preference uncertainty in conflict models.  
AL-Mutairi et al. (2006 a, b, and d), acknowledge preference uncertainty and try 
to handle it by using means of fuzzy logic. The definitions of Nash, GMR, SMR, and 
SEQ have been extended to accommodate this fuzziness in information for both two and 
multiple participants cases. This line of research constitutes one major component of this 
thesis. 
State stability is assessed based on the behavioral patterns of the DM of interest 
depending on the solution concept under consideration. Different solution concepts being 
applied within the paradigm of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution include Nash 
stability (Nash) (Nash, 1950, 1951), general metarationality (GMR) (Howard, 1971), 
symmetric metarationality (SMR) (Howard, 1971), sequential stability (SEQ) (Fraser and 
Hipel, 1979, 1984), limited move stability (Lh, h > 1) (Kilgour, 1985; Zagare, 1984; Fang 
et al., 1993), and non-myopic stability (NM) (Brams and Wittman, 1981; Kilgour, 1984).  
Applying these solution concepts within the graph model structure enables one to 
consider different key factors such as foresight level and strategic risk. The decision 
support system GMCR II (Hipel, et al., 1997; Fang, et al., 2003a,b; Peng, 1999) 
implements these solution concepts within GMCR in an easy, efficient, and user-friendly 
way. Equipped with an analysis engine and interactive menus, GMCR II generates 
equilibrium states under different solution concepts. 
Upon reaching a resolution or an equilibrium for the conflict under study, it might 
be of interest to two or more of the DMs involved in that conflict to form a coalition in 
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order to reach a more preferred equilibrium. Some conditions are applicable for an 
allowable coalition. First, the move has to be from one equilibrium to another more 
preferred equilibrium for at least two or more of the DMs. Second, it has to be not 
reachable by a unilateral move by one of the DMs. Last, the new move by the coalition 
can’t be sanctioned by a move of none coalition members (Fraser and Hipel, 1984). 
The coalition move to a more preferred equilibrium may include moving to a 
transitional intermediate state. This intermediate state might be less preferred by some of 
the coalition members and at the same time more preferred by other members. This raises 
the question of what motivates the coalition members to meet their obligation and move 
the coalition to its intended final state. More importantly, what motivates this coalition in 
the first place? AL-Mutairi et al (2005b, 2006c), introduce a new methodology to assess 
trust using fuzzy logic in order to study the feasibility of forming a coalition. This new 
proposed methodology was expanded to include possible applications in multiagent 
systems, electronic transactions, and decision making in general. The new concept of 
trust is also introduced to bridge the gap between the known and unknown information in 
situations of coalitions and interactions with entities for the first time. 
 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
The objective of this thesis is to redefine the solution concepts of Nash, GMR, SMR, and 
SEQ stabilities in order to accommodate preference uncertainties using fuzzy logic. 
These new solution concepts are to be defined for both two and multiple decision maker 
situations. Also a comprehensive and extended survey of trust from different disciplines 
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is carried out. This helps to examine the current trust models and analyze where and why 
they are different. A fuzzy logic based modeling of trust is also proposed for use in 
coalition and decision making situations. 
The reminder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 begins with an 
overview of the graph model for conflict resolution and the decision support systems 
GMCR I and its descendent GMCR II. In Chapter 3, the four solution concepts of Nash, 
GMR, SMR and SEQ, are redefined to accommodate the new fuzzy preference structure 
for two-DM cases. These solution concepts have been applied to the famous Prisoner’s 
Dilemma to show its applicability. In Chapter 4, the concepts of group unilateral moves 
and group unilateral improvements are introduced. The four solution concepts are also 
redefined for the multiple participants cases. A real world conflict of an underground 
water contamination is presented for analysis in this chapter. Chapter 5 gives an extensive 
assessment of trust research from different disciplines along with an overview of the 
existing trust models. Chapter 6 proposes a new trust modeling approach based on fuzzy 
logic. Chapter 7 concludes with a summary for the thesis’ original contributions and 
directions of future research extensions and work. Figure 1.1 summarizes the thesis 
outline and the research methodologies. 
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Figure 1.1: Thesis outline and research methodology. 
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The Graph Model for Conflict 
Resolution 
A variety of approaches have been put forward to better model and analyze real life 
conflicts. Most of the current modeling approaches have some game theoretical bases. 
This dates back to the year 1944 when Von Neumann and Morgenstern published their 
seminal book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. In 1971, Howard introduced the 
metagame analysis (Howard, 1971) which was followed by the conflict analysis approach 
of Fraser and Hipel (1979, 1984). The most feasible and intuitive approach to conflict 
resolution is the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution, which was developed by Fang, 
Hipel, and Kilgour (Fang et al., 1993).  In this chapter, the Graph Model for Conflict 




2.1 Graph Model for Conflict Resolution: Structure and 
Implementation 
The general steps to follow when applying the graph model for conflict resolution to a 
real life dispute are shown in Figure 2.1. As depicted in this figure, there are two stages to 
studying a conflict: modeling and analysis. In the modeling stage, the key decision 
makers (DMs), options for each DM, and each DM’s preferences are identified. In the 
analysis stage, stability calculations can be carried out manually (for relatively small 
conflicts) or using the GMCR I or GMCR II software to determine the stable states for 
each DM and the equilibria.  
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Fang et al. (1993), represent the states as nodes of a graph and the possible DM’s moves 
as arcs. Assuming that the set of DMs is represented by {1, 2,..., }N n=  and the set of 
states is denoted by 1 2{ , ,..., },qS s s s= then the graph model can represented as the 
collection of the finite directed graphs { ( , ), }i iD S A i N= ∈  where Di is DM i’s directed 
graph and Ai is the set of directed arcs of DM i. 
 On the set of feasible states represented by the Cartesian product ( ),S S×  each 
DM can express his or her relative preferences. DM i can prefer state s1 to s2 or be 
indifferent between the two using the notation 1 2is s  and 1 2 ,is s∼  respectively. 
 Each DM controls the moves in his or her own directed graph. The direction of 
the move from one state to another is shown using directional arrows. The common 
vertices within all the DMs’ graphs constitute the feasible states. From this graph, one 
can identify the reachable list of states by a specific DM. For DM i, the reachable list can 
be defined as: 
   { : ( , ) }i k k iR s S s s A= ∈ ∈     2.1 
 
 In this case, the reachable list for DM i, is the set of states reachable in one step 
from state s by DM i. If ,k is s  then the move by DM i constitutes a Unilateral 
Improvement (UI). Hence, the set of UIs by DM i can be defined as: 
 
   { ( ) : }i k i k iR s R s s s
+ = ∈     2.2 
 If i ks s or ,i ks s∼  then the set of moves by DM i constitutes a set of states that 
are less or equally preferred to state s. Therefore, this set of states can be defined as: 
 
   { ( ) : }i k i i kR s R s s s
− = ∈ ≥     2.3 
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 Some of the key characteristics of Graph Model for Conflict Resolution are: 
• Can handle any finite number of DMs and states. 
• Can handle reversible and irreversible moves. 
• Can handle common moves for which two or more of the DMs can 
unilaterally cause the conflict to move from an initial state to the same 
final state. 
• Is easy to visualize and inspect. 
• Can support a variety of solution concepts. 
 
The example of a potential nuclear power confrontation shown in Figure 2.2 
(Fang et al., 1993) is used to better explain these advantages. In this example, each of the 
two DMs has three options: peace (P), conventional attack (C), and nuclear war (W for 
nuclear winter). The first entry on each node represents the strategy choice by DM 1 
while the second entry stands for the strategy choice by DM 2. The graph displays some 
of the reversible moves like, the move between PP and CP in DM 1’s graph. It also 
shows the concepts of irreversible and common moves as depicted by all the arrows 
going to the node W on both graphs. 
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Figure 2.2: Nuclear power confrontation. 
 
 
2.2 Stability Analysis: Concepts and Definitions 
A state is said to be stable with respect to DM i if and only if DM i is not willing to 
deviate from it. Whenever the same state is stable for all DMs, it is said to be an 
equilibrium and may be a possible resolution for the conflict under study. The solution 
concepts of Nash, General Metarationality (GMR), Symmetric Metarationality (SMR), 
and Sequential stability (SEQ) are now defined for the case of two DMs: 
 
Definition 2.3.1 Nash stability (Nash): For , ,i j N∈  a state s S∈ is Nash stable for 
DM i, denoted by ,Nashis S∈ iff ( ) .iR s φ
+ =  
 Under Nash stability, DM i will always make use of any possible UIs without 
taking the opponent’s move into consideration. Hence, a state s is Nash stable for DM i 









Graph for DM 1 Graph for DM 2 
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Definition 2.3.2 General metarational (GMR): For , ,i j N∈  a state s S∈  is general 
metarationally stable for DM i, denoted by ,GMRis S∈  iff for every 1 ( )is R s
+∈ there exists 
2 1( )js R s∈  such that 2 ( ).is R s
−∈     
 Hence, every potential UI by DM i can be sanctioned by a unilateral move by DM 
j regardless of DM j’s preferences. For the situation in which DM i has no UI from state 
s, the state is Nash stable which also implies GMR stability. 
Definition 2.3.3 Symmetric metarational (SMR): For , ,i j N∈  a state s S∈ is 
symmetric metarationally stable for DM i, denoted by ,SMRis S∈ iff for every 1 ( )is R s
+∈  
there exists 2 1( )js R s∈  such that 2 is R
−∈  and 3 ( )is R s
−∈  for all 3 2( ).is R s∈   
Accordingly, every potential UI by DM i can be sanctioned by a unilateral move 
levied by DM j regardless of DM j’s preference, and DM i cannot escape from this 
sanction by a countermove. For the situation in which DM i has no UI from state s, the 
state is Nash stable which also implies SMR stability. 
Definition 2.3.4 Sequential stability (SEQ): For , ,i j N∈  a state s S∈  is sequentially 
stable for DM i, denoted by ,SEQis S∈  iff for every 1 ( )is R s
+∈  there exists 
2 1( )js R s
+∈ such that 2 ( ).is R s
−∈   
Hence, every potential UI by DM i can be sanctioned by a UI by DM j. For the 
situation in which DM i has no UI from state s, the state is Nash stable which also implies 
SEQ stability. 
 In the two DMs case one needs to consider only the response of one opponent 
while in the n-DMs case one needs to consider a move or group of moves by all 
opponents. The solution concepts of Nash, General Metarationality (GMR), Symmetric 
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Metarationality (SMR), and Sequential stability (SEQ) are now defined for the case of n-
DMs: 
Definition 2.3.5 Nash stability (Nash): For ,i N∈  a state s S∈ is Nash stable for DM 
i, denoted by ,Nashis S∈ iff ( ) .iR s φ
+ =  
 Under Nash stability, DM i will always make use of any possible UIs without 
taking the opponent’s move into consideration. Hence, a state s is Nash stable for DM i 
iff i has no further UIs from state s. 
Definition 2.3.6 General metarational (GMR): For ,i N∈  a state s S∈  is general 
metarationally stable for DM i, denoted by ,GMRis S∈  iff for every 1 ( )is R s
+∈ there exists 
at least one  2 1( )N is R s−∈  such that 2 ( ).is R s
−∈     
 Hence, every potential UI by DM i can be sanctioned by a move by the opponents 
N i− regardless of 'N i s− preferences. For the situation in which DM i has no UI from 
state s, the state is Nash stable which also implies GMR stability. 
Definition 2.3.7 Symmetric metarational (SMR): For ,i N∈  a state s S∈ is 
symmetric metarationally stable for DM i, denoted by ,SMRis S∈ iff for every 1 ( )is R s
+∈  
there exists at least one  2 1( )N is R s−∈  such that 2 is R
−∈  and 3 ( )is R s
−∈  for all 
3 2( ).is R s∈   
Accordingly, every potential UI by DM i can be sanctioned by a move levied by 
N i− regardless of 'N i s− preferences, and DM i cannot escape from this sanction by a 
countermove. For the situation in which DM i has no UI from state s, the state is Nash 
stable which also implies SMR stability. 
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Definition 2.3.8 Sequential stability (SEQ): For ,i N∈  a state s S∈  is sequentially 
stable for DM i, denoted by ,SEQis S∈  iff for every 1 ( )is R s
+∈  there exists 
2 1( )N is R s
+
−∈ such that 2 ( ).is R s
−∈   
Hence, every potential UI by DM i can be sanctioned by a UI by DMs N-i. For the 
situation in which DM i has no UI from state s, the state is Nash stable which also implies 
SEQ stability. 
   Table 2.1 lists all the above solution concepts along with their behavioral patterns 
like, foresight, disimprovements, knowledge of preferences, and the risk attitudes. 











A focal DM cannot unilaterally 
move to a more preferred state. 
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All of the focal DM’s unilateral 
improvements are sanctioned 
by subsequent unilateral  moves 
by others. 




All focal DM’s unilateral 
improvements are still 
sanctioned even after possible 
responses by the focal DM. 




All of the focal DM’s unilateral 
improvements are sanctioned 
by subsequent unilateral 
improvements by others. 






2.3 Stability Analysis using GMCR I and II Software 
The graph model for conflict resolution software known as GMCR I was first introduced 
in the year 1993 as a DOS-based solver (Fang et al., 1993). It provides stability analysis 
under different types of solution concepts. The second generation of the software, known 
also as GMCR II, was introduced in 1997 (Hipel, et al., 1997; Fang et al., 2003a, b; Peng, 
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1999). It was programmed in the C language and works under a Windows environment. 
GMCR II is more user-friendly and possesses more interactive menus than GMCR I. It 
provides a variety of information such as individual stability, overall equilibria, and 
possible coalitions.  
 When using GMCR II, the user is asked to input the DM, their options, specify 
the preferences, and the possible combination of infeasibilities. The system will then 
remove the infeasible states automatically, generate the ordinal preferences, the 
individual stabilities, and the overall equilibria under different solution concepts. The 
flowchart of the GMCR II system is shown in Figure 2.3. It has been designed to allow 
the user to easily setup, update, and modify the conflict under study. GMCR II allows the 
user to retrieve a previously modeled conflict and give the analyst the ability to change 
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another stability 
analysis? 













An overview of the graph model for conflict resolution and its associated software 
GMCR I and GMCR II are covered in this chapter. A flowchart of the GMCR II system 
is presented in Figure 2.3. Definitions of the solution concepts of Nash, GMR, SMR, and 
SEQ are also given for the case of two DMs. In Chapters 3 and 4, these solution concepts 

















Uncertain Preferences in Conflicts 
with two Participants 
Expressing the preferences of the DMs involved in a conflict or a dispute over the set of 
states is important for predicting a realistic resolution for that conflict. However, in 
practice, it is not always the case that these preferences can be easily identified. There are 
cases where the preferences may be uncertain or vague. This vagueness and 
impreciseness in preferences could influence the predicted resolution or equilibria. 
This chapter introduces new definitions for the known solution concepts of Nash, 
GMR, SMR, and SEQ using fuzzy logic in order to account for the preferences’ 
uncertainties for conflicts with two decision makers. Interrelationships among the newly 
defined solution concepts are also investigated. The well-known game of Prisoner’s 




3.1 Preference Structures 
Determining the stability of a specific state for a given decision maker (DM) depends 
mainly on the preferences of the DM. Preferences are often expressed using cardinal 
values or ordinal preferences. Using cardinal values (payoffs) reveals more information 
than ordinal preferences. While ordinal or relative preferences only express the DM’s 
ordering of alternatives or states, cardinal payoffs reveal the ordering and the strength of 
the preference among the states. Since ordinal preferences are implied by cardinal values, 
any model that can handle ordinal preferences can also accommodate cardinal values. 
The graph model for conflict resolution (Fang et al., 1993) requires only relative 
preference information.  
 Pairwise preference information constitutes the most basic form of preference 
information. For the case of the graph model for conflict resolution, the preference 
assumptions are as follows. Given 1 2, ,s s S∈  where S is the set of states, decision maker i 
(DM i) either strictly prefers s1 to s2 (denoted as 1 2is s> ) or is indifferent between the 
two (denoted as s1 ~i s2). Those binary relationships can be characterized by the following 
properties: 
1. > is asymmetric: for all 1 2, ,s s S∈  1 2 ,is s>  and 2 1is s>  cannot hold simultaneously. 
2. ~ is reflexive: for any 1 ,s S∈  s1~i s1. 
3. ~ is symmetric: for all 1 2, ,s s S∈  if s1 ~i s2 then s2 ~i s1. 
4. { > , ~} is complete: for all 1 2, ,s s S∈ exactly one of 1 2 ,is s> 2 2 ,is s>  or 1 2is s∼  is 
true. 
 23
 In the ordinal preference definition, the states are ordered or ranked from most to 
least preferred, where ties are allowed. When the preferences of some states are the same 
or when the preferences are not known for sure, the states are said to be equally preferred. 
In other words, the DM is not in favor of one state over the other. When the states are 
ranked from most to least preferred with no equally preferred states, the ranking of states 
is said to be strictly ordinal. 
 Transitivity is a common underlying preference assumption. If the DM prefers 
state p to state q, and state q to r, this implies that p is more preferred to r. The ordinal 
preference definition assumes transitivity.  
 In cardinal preferences, the payoffs of each state are expressed using real 
numbers.  Often cardinal utility theory (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) is 
assumed whereby each state is assigned a utility value. Similar to ordinal preferences, 
transitivity is one of the underlying assumptions of cardinal preferences.   
Generally speaking, imprecision is a key issue when it comes to human judgment, 
in general, and expressing preferences, in particular. In some situations, a DM’s 
preferences are unclear or imprecise with respect to two or more states. This imprecision 
in preferences may affect the overall equilibrium predicted for a specific conflict. 
Acknowledging this lack of precision and trying to handle it using a fuzzy logic 
approach, is one key contribution of this research.    
    
3.2 Fuzzy Preference Structure 
When DM’s preferences on a set of states are vague or imprecise, fuzzy approaches 
provide a flexible framework for handling them (Li et al., 2001; Tanino, 1988; Tanino, 
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1990). The two main streams in preferences elicitation are binary and non-binary 
representations. In a binary representation, the preferences are compared at the most basic 
level. Each of two states or alternatives, as described in the previous section, are 
compared in a pairwise fashion. The non-binary representation could include both 
relative preferences (ordinal) and cardinal values (payoffs). In the non-binary case, the 
overall preferences among the different states are taken into consideration rather than just 
a pairwise one (Barrett et al., 1990). 
  
3.2.1 Foundational Definitions 
Let S = {s1, s2, …, sn}be a given set of states. Assuming that R is a matrix of binary fuzzy 
relationships on the Cartesian product S×S, then r(si,sj) or, written simply as rij denotes 
the relative degree of preference of state i over state j.  Following this idea, the 
information matrix, R, is constructed using a square matrix with i rows and j columns 
where the diagonal (i = j) is always an indifferent preference. A fuzzy function is needed 
to execute the mapping which associates a fuzzy membership value for each value in the 
input space (usually a real line) for each state.  
The fuzzy function is characterized by a function F to do the mapping into [0,1] 
where F(x,µx) denotes the relative degree of preference µx for state s, and x may represent 
a cardinal preference value for a specific state and DM. In this research, a simple 










Figure 3.1: Preference representation using five triangular fuzzy sets. 
 
The fuzzy domain of preferences can be divided into five regions with the 
following linguistic labels: 
Much More (MM): refers to all the states that are strongly preferred. 
More (M): means all the states that are more preferred. 
Indifferent (I): refers to all the states that are equally preferred. 
Less (L): means all the states that are less preferred. 
Much Less (ML): refers to all the states that are strongly less preferred. 
Using the new fuzzy preference structure, for the state ,s S∈ a particular DM i, 
can identify the following subsets with respect to s:  
{ }( ) :MMi m m is s s sΦ = is the set of states that are much more preferred by DM i 
to state s. In this case, sm and s belong to two different fuzzy sets. For example, the values 
0.3 and 0.7 on the horizontal axis in Figure 3.1 belong to the fuzzy sets “less” and “more” 
preferred, respectively.  
{ }( ) :Mi m m is s s sΦ = > is the set of states that are more preferred by DM i to state 
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example, the values 0.7 and 0.8 on the horizontal axis in Figure 3.1 both belong to the 
fuzzy set “more” but with different memberships of 1.0 and 0.5, respectively, as indicated 
on the vertical axis. 
{ }( ) :Ii m m is s s sΦ = ∼  is the set of states that are equally preferred by DM i to 
state s. The states sm and s belong to the same fuzzy set with the same or extremely close 
memberships. 
{ }( ) :Li m i ms s s sΦ = >  is the set of states that are less preferred by DM i to state 
s. The states sm and s belong to the same fuzzy set but with different memberships. 
{ }( ) :MLi m i ms s s sΦ =  is the set of states that are much less preferred by DM i 
to state s. The states sm and s belong to two different fuzzy sets. 
All of the states reachable in a single step by a specific DM i from state s are 
elements of the reachable list Ri(s). The reachable list can be divided into the following 
subsets: 
( ) ( ) ( )MM MMi i iR s R s s= ∩Φ  
( ) ( ) ( )M Mi i iR s R s s= ∩Φ  
( ) ( ) ( )I Ii i iR s R s s= ∩Φ  
( ) ( ) ( )L Li i iR s R s s= ∩Φ  
( ) ( ) ( )ML MLi i iR s R s s= ∩Φ  
The set of Unilateral Improvements (UIs) for a specific DM i from a particular 
state s are: 
( ) ( ).M MMi iR s R s∪  
The membership functions of the five fuzzy sets in Figure 3.1 are given by: 
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3.3 Stability Definitions under Fuzzy Preferences 
Under a particular solution concept or stability definition, a state s is said to be stable for 
DM i if and only if (iff) DM i has no incentive to deviate from state s. In other words, 
DM i has no UIs from that state or the DM may end up in a worse situation due to 
sanctioning by others if he or she takes advantage of any UI. If a state is stable for all 
DMs, it constitutes an equilibrium state and, therefore, a possible resolution to the 
conflict. When the incentive for a DM not to deviate from a given state is connected to 
greatly less preferred states, the stability is said to be strong for that DM – otherwise it is 
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weak. If a particular state is strongly stable for all DMs, the state constitutes a strong 
equilibrium – otherwise it is weak. This idea is different but analogous to the concept of 
strong and weak stability proposed by Hamouda et al. (Hamouda et al., 2004). The 
stability definitions given next, are for a conflict consisting of two DMs i and j who are 
members of the set of DMs given by N.  
Definition 3.3.1 Strong Nash stability (SNash): For DMs , ,i j N∈  a state s S∈ is 
strongly Nash stable for DM i, denoted by ,SNashis S∈  iff ( ) ( )
M MM
i iR s R s φ∪ =  and 
( )MMi ks s∈Φ  for all ks  where ks  is any state k from which DM i can unilaterally reach 
state s in one step.  
A state s is said to be strongly Nash stable for a particular DM i  iff i has no UIs 
from state s and s is much more preferred to all other states reachable from state s by DM 
i. In other words, the preference for state s doesn’t belong to the same fuzzy set or an 
adjacent overlapping set representing the preference for the remaining reachable states.  
Since Nash stability does not take into consideration countermoves by any other DM, this 
definition holds for 2.N ≥  
Definition 3.3.2 Weak Nash stability (WNash): For DMs , ,i j N∈  a state s S∈ is 
weakly Nash stable for DM i, denoted by ,WNashis S∈  iff ( ) ( )
M MM
i iR s R s φ∪ =  and for all 
sk for which ( ) ( ) ( )MM MM Ii k i k i ks s s s∈Φ ∪Φ ∪Φ  there exists at least one ks such that 
( ) ( )M Ii k i ks s s∈Φ ∪Φ  where ks is any state k from which DM i can unilaterally reach 
state s in one step.  
A state s is said to be weakly Nash stable for a particular DM i iff i has no UIs 
from a state s and s is more preferred to all other states reachable from state s. Hence, the 
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preference for state s could belong to the same fuzzy set or an adjacent overlapping set 
representing the fuzzy preference for one of the states reachable from s. Since Nash 
stability doesn’t take into consideration the countermoves by any other DM, this 
definition holds for 2.N ≥  
Definition 3.3.3 Nash stability (Nash): The set of Nash stable states for DM i is 
.Nash SNash WNashi i iS S S= ∪  
Definition 3.3.4 General metarationality (GMR): For DMs , ,i j N∈  a state s S∈ is 
general metarationally stable for DM i, denoted by ,GMRis S∈  iff for every 
1 ( ) ( )
M MM
i is R s R s∈ ∪  there exists 2 1( )js R s∈  such that 2 ( ) ( ) ( ).
I L ML
i i is s s s∈Φ ∪Φ ∪Φ  
 Hence, every potential UI by DM i can be sanctioned by a unilateral move by 
DM j regardless of DM j’s preferences. For the situation in which DM i has no UI from 
state s, the state is Nash stable which also implies GMR stability. 
 
Definition 3.3.5 Strong general metarationality (SGMR): For DMs , ,i j N∈  a state 
s S∈ is strongly general metarationally stable for DM i, denoted by ,SGMRis S∈  iff  
GMR
is S∈  and for every 1 ( ) ( )
M MM
i is R s R s∈ ∪  there exists 2 1( )js R s∈  such that 
2 ( ).
ML
is s∈Φ   
Therefore, every potential UI by DM i can be strongly sanctioned by a unilateral 
move levied by DM j regardless of DM j’s preferences. For the case in which DM i has 
no UI from state s, SGMR is defined to exist only if state s is strongly Nash stable. 
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Definition 3.3.6 Weak general metarationality (WGMR): For DMs , ,i j N∈  a state 
s S∈ is weakly general metarationally stable for DM i, denoted by ,WGMRis S∈  iff 
GMR
is S∈ and for at least one 1 ( ) ( ),
M MM
i is R s R s∈ ∪  1( ) ( ) .
ML
j iR s s φ∩Φ =   
Every potential UI by DM i can be sanctioned but there is at least one UI by DM i 
that can only be weakly sanctioned by DM j. For the situation in which DM i has no UI 
from state s, WGMR is defined to exist only if state s is weakly Nash stable. 
Definition 3.3.7 Symmetric metarationality (SMR): For DMs , ,i j N∈  a state 
s S∈ is symmetric metarationally stable for DM i, denoted by ,SMRis S∈ iff for every 
1 ( ) ( )
M MM
i is R s R s∈ ∪  there exists 2 1( )js R s∈  such that 2 ( ) ( ) ( )
I L ML
i i is s s s∈Φ ∪Φ ∪Φ  
and 3 ( ) ( ) ( )
I L ML
i i is s s s∈Φ ∪Φ ∪Φ  for all 3 2( ).is R s∈   
Accordingly, every potential UI by DM i can be sanctioned by a unilateral move 
levied by DM j regardless of DM j’s preference, and DM i cannot escape from this 
sanction by a countermove. For the situation in which DM i has no UI from state s, the 
state is Nash stable which also implies SMR stability. 
 
Definition 3.3.8 Strong symmetric metarationality (SSMR): For DMs , ,i j N∈  a 
state s S∈ is strongly symmetric metarationally stable for DM i, denoted by ,SSMRis S∈  
iff SMRis S∈  and for every 1 ( ) ( )
M MM
i is R s R s∈ ∪ there exists 2 1( )js R s∈  such that 
2 ( )
ML
is s∈Φ and 3 ( )
ML
is s∈Φ  for all 3 2( ).is R s∈   
Every potential UI by DM i can be strongly sanctioned by a move levied by DM j 
regardless of  DM j’s preference, and DM i cannot escape from this sanction by a 
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countermove. For the case in which DM i has no UI from state s, SSMR is defined to 
exist only if state s is strongly Nash stable. 
Definition 3.3.9 Weak symmetric metarationality (WSMR): For DMs , ,i j N∈  a 
state s S∈ is weakly symmetric metarationally stable for DM i, denoted by ,WSMRis S∈  iff 
SMR
is S∈  and for at least one 1 ( ) ( ),
M MM
i is R s R s∈ ∪  exactly one of the following 
conditions is met: 
1. There exists  2 1( )js R s∈  such that 2 ( ) ( ) ( )
I L ML
i i is s s s∈Φ ∪Φ ∪Φ  but for at least 
one 2 1( ),js R s∈  2 ( )
ML
is s∉Φ  and 3 ( ) ( ) ( )
I L ML
i i is s s s∈Φ ∪Φ ∪Φ  for all 
3 2( ).is R s∈  
2. There exists 2 1( )js R s∈  such that 2 ( )
ML
is s∈Φ  and 3 ( ) ( )
I L
i is s s∈Φ ∪Φ  for at 
least one 3 2( ).is R s∈  
At least one potential UI by DM i will be strongly sanctioned by a move levied by 
DM j but a countermove by DM i will weaken the sanction or the sanction is weak in the 
first place but it is inescapable by DM i. For the situation in which DM i has no UI from 
state s, WSMR is defined to exist only if state s is weakly Nash stable. 
 
Definition 3.3.10 Sequential stability (SEQ): For DMs , ,i j N∈  a state s S∈  is 
sequentially stable for DM i, denoted by ,SEQis S∈  iff for every 1 ( ) ( )
M MM
i is R s R s∈ ∪  
there exists 2 1 1( ) ( )
M MM
j js R s R s∈ ∪ such that 2 ( ) ( ) ( ).
I L ML
i i is s s s∈Φ ∪Φ ∪Φ   
Therefore, every potential UI by DM i can be sanctioned by the opponent j’s  UIs. 
For the situation in which DM i  has no UI from state s, the state is Nash stable which 
also implies SEQ stability. 
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Definition 3.3.11 Strong sequential stability (SSEQ): For DMs , ,i j N∈  a state 
s S∈ is strongly sequentially stable for DM i, denoted by ,SSEQis S∈  iff 
SEQ
is S∈  and for 
every 1 ( ) ( )
M MM
i is R s R s∈ ∪  there exists 2 1 1( ) ( )
M MM
j js R s R s∈ ∪  such that 2 ( ).
ML
is s∈Φ   
Hence, every potential UI by DM i can be strongly sanctioned by the opponent j’s  
UIs. For the case in which DM i has no UI from state s, SSEQ is defined to exist only if 
state s is strongly Nash stable. 
Definition 3.3.12 Weak sequential stability (WSEQ): For DMs , ,i j N∈  a state 
s S∈ is weakly sequentially stable for DM i, denoted by ,WSEQis S∈  iff 
SEQ
is S∈  and for 
at least one 1 ( ) ( ),
M MM
i is R s R s∈ ∪  1 1( ( ) ( )) ( ) .
M MM ML
j j iR s R s s φ∪ ∩Φ =   
Hence, at least one UI by DM i does not produce a much less preferred state as a 
result of a credible sanction by the opponent DM j. For the situation in which DM i has 
no UI from state s, WSEQ is defined to exist only if state s is weakly Nash stable. 
 
3.4  Interrelationships among Stability Definitions 
Knowing the relationships between the different solution concepts can be very useful. 
Fang et al. (1993) have proven that a state s that is Nash is also GMR, SMR, and SEQ. In 
other words, if s satisfies Nashis S∈  then it also must satisfy ,
GMR
is S∈  ,
SMR
is S∈  and 
.SEQis S∈  Likewise, a state s that satisfies 
SNash
is S∈  also satisfies ,
SGMR
is S∈  ,
SSMR
is S∈  
and .SSEQis S∈  On the other hand, a state s that satisfies 
WNash
is S∈  also satisfies 
,WGMRis S∈  ,
WSMR
is S∈  and .
WSEQ
is S∈     
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 By definition, the relationships between the weak and strong solution concepts are 
as follows: 
.Nash WNash SNashi i iS S S= ∪  
.GMR WGMR SGMRi i iS S S= ∪  
.SMR WSMR SSMRi i iS S S= ∪  
.SEQ WSEQ SSEQi i iS S S= ∪  
 
3.5 Fuzzy Binary Preference Relationships 
As mentioned earlier, the preferences of a DM can be expressed using pairwise 
comparisons. In this section, the terminology is modified to incorporate fuzziness in 
preferences.  For the fuzzy relationship to hold on the Cartesian product S×S, the 
following conditions should be met: 
1. Transitivity:  
, , 1,..., ,    ( , ) 0.5,i ji j k n r s s∃ = ≥  ( , ) 0.5j kr s s ≥  ( , ) min( ( , ), ( , )).i k i j j kr s s r s s r s s⇒ ≥  
This is known as the max-min transitivity (Dubois and Prade, 1980). 
2. , ,i jx x X∀ ∈  0 ( , ) 1.i jr s s≤ ≤  
When ( , ) 1,i jr s s =  this indicates that si is more preferred to sj. The interval 
0.5 ( , ) 1i jr s s≤ ≤  denotes the definite preference interval. When ( , ) 0.5,i jr s s =  this 
means that si is equally preferred to sj. On the other hand, when ( , ) 0,i jr s s =  this means 
that si is less preferred to sj. The interval 0 ( , ) 0.5i jr s s≤ ≤  denotes the definite less 
preference interval. The membership functions of the three fuzzy sets in Figure 3.2, 
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where LP, I, and MP refer to less preferred, indifferent, and more preferred, respectively, 
are given as: 
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Figure 3.2: Fuzzy binary relationship. 
 
 
3.6 Fuzzy versus Non-fuzzy Preferences 
Non-fuzzy preferences could be considered as having a fuzzy value of one which means 
zero fuzziness (crisp). Hence, the non-fuzzy case will always be a subset of the fuzzy one 
(see Figure 3.3). When representing a fuzzy preference using a single value rather than a 
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( , ) 0,0.5,  and 1i jr s s = correspond to the strict preferences consisting of less preferred, 
equally preferred, and more preferred, respectively, for all , 1,...,   ( , 1,..., ).i j n i j n= ∀ =  
In other words, when ( , ) 1,i jr s s =  this indicates that si is more preferred to sj and it is 
denoted as i js s>  in a non-fuzzy representation. Any value in the interval 
0.5 ( , ) 1i jr s s≤ ≤  indicates a definite preference but with different relative degrees. 
When ( , ) 0.5,i jr s s =  this means that si is equally preferred to sj and the notation in a 








Figure 3.3: Fuzzy non-fuzzy relationship. 
 
When ( , ) 0,i jr s s =  this means that si is less preferred to sj and the notation in a non-
fuzzy representation is .j is s>  Any value in the interval 0 ( , ) 0.5i jr s s≤ ≤  definitely 
indicates less preference but with different relative degrees. The fuzzy max-min 
transitivity implies the usual transitivity: ,i js s≥  ,j ks s≥  ,i ks s⇒ ≥  
{ }, , 1, 2,..., .i j k n∀ ∈  For the case of having mixed fuzzy and non-fuzzy preferences, 














3.7 Prisoner’s Dilemma from a Fuzzy Perspective 
In 1984, Axelrod (Axelrod, 1984) analyzed cooperation by means of a 2× 2 non-
zero-sum game called "Prisoner's Dilemma". In this game, the two DMs have two 
strategies: either “cooperate” (called strategy C) or “defect” (labeled as strategy D). Thus, 
the game is called a 2×2 game. While both DMs gain equally when cooperating, if only 
one of them cooperates, the other one who defects, will gain more. If both defect, both 
lose (or gain very little) (Binmore, 1992). Table 3.1 summarizes the complete game 
situation and its different states or outcomes. Notice, in this table that DM 1, or prisoner 
1, controls the row strategies while DM 2 controls the column strategies. When each DM 
selects a strategy, a state is formed, which is represented by a cell in the matrix. The 
double letters given at the top of a cell represent the strategies of the DMs where the 
letters on the left and right stand for the strategies of DMs 1 and 2, respectively. Hence, 
the cell given as CD which will be referred to by the encircled number 2 for simplicity 
sake, is the state in which DM 1 cooperates and DM 2 defects. The two numbers given in 
brackets in the middle of a cell represent the preferences of DM 1 (left entry) and DM 2 
(right entry), where a higher number means more preferred. The hypothetical quantities 
given in brackets at the bottom of a cell are meant to represent the cardinal preference 
values, where the left and right entries are for DMs 1 and 2, respectively. The higher the 
number, the fewer years in prison. 
The following hypothetical situation is the reason behind the game’s name. Two 
criminals have been arrested under the suspicion of having committed a crime together. 
Due to lack of evidence, the police can’t convict them. While keeping them separated, the 
police separately offer each of them a deal. The one helping the police to convict the 
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other one will be set free. If they cooperate with each other (by rejecting the police’s 
offer), both of them will be jailed for a short time and they both will gain the same 
amount. However, each has an incentive to confess to the police in order to be set free. In 
this case, the defector will gain more, since he or she will be freed; the one who remains 
silent, on the other hand, will receive the full punishment. If both comply with the 
police’s request, both will be jailed, but for less time than if one had refused to talk and 
the other had confessed. The dilemma arises because each prisoner needs to make a wise 
decision which is not possible without knowing the other’s choice. 
 
Table 3.1: Prisoner's Dilemma in normal form. 
  DM 2 
























 1. Relative preferences (ordinal). 
 2. Cardinal payoffs. 
 
In many real life situations, one can encounter such distributions of gains and 
losses. While the cooperator, whose action is not reciprocated, will lose resources to the 
defector, neither of them will be able to get the additional gain coming from their 
cooperation. The gain for mutual cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma is kept smaller than 
the gain for one-sided defection so that there would always be an incentive to defect, 
though this assumption might not be generally valid. For example, it is better when two 
hunters together hunt a stag rather than hunting individually as they would for a hare. 




would still have less gain compared to the case in which he or she had helped his or her 
companion to hunt a stag. 
One of the problems associated with Prisoner's Dilemma is rationality. If both 
DMs were purely rational, they would never cooperate. A rational decision-making 
process means that a particular DM makes the decision which is best for him or her 
regardless of the other DM’s choices. If the other DM decided to defect, then it is rational 
for the given DM to defect. While not gaining by doing so, the initial DM is still avoiding 
the maximum stay in prison. On the other hand, if the other DM decided to cooperate, the 
rational choice for the particular DM is to defect so he or she will gain more. If both are 
rational, both will decide to defect, and neither of them will gain anything. On the other 
hand, if both would "irrationally" decide to cooperate, both would spend less time in jail. 
The problem now is to find the appropriate mix between the two scenarios. 
When knowing nothing about any future interactions, Prisoner's Dilemma is a 
generic way for studying short term decision-making. Assuming the evolution of 
experience is a cumulative process, long term cooperation can only evolve after short 
term ones have been selected, thereby adding small improvements upon each other but 
without blindly making major blunders.  
Despite the rationalism and the inherent selfishness of people and organizations 
(Dawkins, 1988), some sort of cooperative behavior may occur among different 
individuals. The motives for these cooperative actions could be based on, but not limited 
to, some type of trust, expectancy of reciprocation, or conditional behaviors such as “you 
do this and I will do that”. To better model such cooperative behavior, researchers 
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examine what is called repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma.  This will eventually enable them to 
track the evolution of such behavior (Bendor, 1993; Bendor et al., 1996; Flake, 1998).  
In a single encounter of Prisoner’s Dilemma, if the first prisoner defects, the 
second will defect in response to the first one’s defection. On the other hand, if the first 
one cooperates, the second will defect to get a better payoff. In general, the second player 
always has an incentive to defect. It could also be claimed that the first player is better to 
defect in the first place to avoid betrayal by the second one. However, if they both 
decided to defect regardless of the other’s choice, they will always end up in a less 
preferred situation compared to both cooperating. 
When having repeated encounters of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, DMs have to 
decide between the value of the current encounter and future ones. Players valuing the 
current encounter more are motivated to defect in favor of a short term benefit. On the 
other hand, players seeking a long lasting relationship would be more motivated to build 
a good positive reputation and a trusting relationship (Kollock, 1993). In the following 
sub-sections, some of the well-known strategies for repeated encounters are explained 
(Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod and  Hamilton, 1981; Binmore and Samuelson, 1982; Boerlijst 
et al., 1997; Boyd , 1989; Boyd and Lorberbaum, 1987; Hofstadter, 1983; Kollock, 1993; 
Kraines and Kraines, 1988; Mesterton-Gibbons and Dugatkin,, 1992; Molander, 1985; 
Mukherji, 1986; Nowak and Sigmund, 1993b, 1992; Nowak and May, 1992; Rapaport 
and Chammah, 1965; Sigmund, 1993; Smith, 1982). 
3.7.1 Tit for Tat (TFT) 
Tit for Tat (TFT) is a deterministic strategy. In this strategy, one player starts with a 
cooperative action and then behaves the same as the other in future steps. In other words, 
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one will defect in the current step if the opponent defected in the previous one. Likewise, 
one will cooperate in the current step if the opponent did so in the previous step. This 
strategy is the most well known and has been shown to give the best results in most of the 
cases. This could be interpreted as a kind of reciprocal cooperation, meaning that one will 
cooperate based on the expectancy that the other will cooperate too. This is the safest and 
most rewarding in repeated encounter situations (Axelrod and W. Hamilton, 1981; 
Hofstadter, 1983; Mesterton-Gibbons and Dugatkin, 1992).  
3.7.2 Generous Tit for Tat (GTFT) 
As implied by its name, this strategy is a slightly modified and more generous version of 
the original deterministic TFT strategy. It is mainly based on the assumption of the 
presence of some noise or misperception. Mistakes in the application of some choices and 
misperceptions are two common characteristics of human behavior. When implementing 
this strategy, a player is more forgiving in case of small mistakes or defections in the 
absence of strong evidence that it was intentional. Adding some generosity will 
contribute to more cooperative actions (Molander, 1985; Nowak and Sigmund, 1992).  
3.7.3 Contrite Tit for Tat (CTFT)  
This is another modified version of the famous deterministic TFT strategy. It has three 
main attitudes namely, contrite, content and provoked. The initiating player begins with 
cooperation and keeps cooperating unless there is a defection from the other player. If a 
player defects while content, the victim player becomes provoked and defects until 
cooperation from the other player causes him or her to become content again. If the other 
player is content and the remaining player defects, this player becomes contrite and 
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should cooperate. When contrite, he or she becomes content only after he or she has 
successfully cooperated (Boerlijst et al., 1997; Boyd, 1989). 
3.7.4 Suspicious Tit for Tat (STFT) 
This is also a modified version of the deterministic TFT. It is based on total distrust. To 
be on the safe side and avoid any chances of betrayal, a player will defect on the first 
move; otherwise he or she will do the same as the other player last did. If one makes the 
first move and defects against TFT, the result is continues defection thereafter (Boyd and 
Lorberbaum, 1987; Kollock, 1993).  
3.7.5 Tit for Two Tats (TF2T or TFTT) 
In this strategy, a player is trying to stay somehow neutral (not going to any of the two 
extremes). Based on the expectancy of an unintentional error or misperception, the player 
will cooperate on the first move and defect after two consecutive defections by the 
opponent. It is a more tolerant strategy but very exploitable by a strategy which 
alternately cooperates and defects (Axelrod, 1984; Kollock, 1993). 
3.7.6 PAVLOV 
Pavlov is a stochastic simple win-stay, lose-shift strategy. In brief, if the player’s payoff 
is below a certain level, he or she will change his or her action. Otherwise, the player 
keeps repeating the previous one. A Pavlov player tries to divide game results in each 
step into two groups: success or defeat. If his last result belongs to the success category, 
he or she plays the same move; otherwise he or she chooses another move. A player will 
cooperate if and only if both the protagonist and opponent played identically in the last 
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round. Pavlov success is based on two main advantages: it can correct occasional 
mistakes and exploit unconditional cooperators (Kraines and Kraines, 1988; Nowak and 
Sigmund, 1993b).  
3.7.7 Prudent PAVLOV (P-PAVLOV) 
This is a modified version of the well-known PAVLOV strategy. The main distinction 
lies in the fact that a player will only resume cooperation after two rounds of mutual 
defection. The key advantage of this strategy is that it will allow one to recover from an 
opponent's erroneous or unintentional defection or a misperceived defection (Boerlijst, 
1997). 
3.7.8 REMORSE 
The remorse strategy is the complement of the forgiving one. A player practicing remorse 
switches to cooperation after defecting or being in a “bad standing” or if both players 
cooperated in the last round. Maintaining a record of the opponent’s “standing” can be of 
help recovering from an opponent's erroneous defection. One can call this strategy an 
error-correcting one (Boerlijst, 1997). 
3.7.9 Always Cooperate (ALLC) 
This strategy is based on blind trust. Regardless of the other player’s behavior, the one 
implementing ALLC will always cooperate. A player employing such a strategy is 




3.7.10 Always Defect (ALLD) 
While ALLC is based on blind trust, ALLD is founded on extreme suspicion (trust no 
one). In this case, one will always defect regardless of the other’s choice. It might benefit 
a player in a single encounter but for sure not in the long run or repeated encounters. 
3.7.11 GRIM 
GRIM is an unforgiving strategy that starts with cooperation until the opponent defects 
once, and then defects for the rest of the game. It will cooperate if both players 
cooperated previously but will revert to ALLD if the other player defects. The biggest 
disadvantage is that it cannot recover from an erroneous or misperceived defection 
(Binmore and Samuelson, 1992; Boerlijst, 1997). 
 
3.8 Ordinal Case 
Assuming that the cardinal payoffs of the states are not known, each DM must decide 
whether or not to cooperate based on the relative preference for each state. Since ordinal 
preferences provide only the ranking or the ordering of the states from the most to the 
least preferred, the preferences of both DMs are expressed using linguistic terms from 
Figure 3.1 as shown in Table 3.2 where ML, L, I, M, and MM refer to much less, less, 






Table 3.2: Prisoner's Dilemma in normal form using ordinal preferences. 
  DM 2 






















3.8.1 Nash stability 
To asses the Nash stability, each DM considers only his or her own preferences. In other 
words, each DM will compare the preferences of two states at the same time in a binary 
fashion. DM 1 controls the row strategies and can move in a bidirectional fashion 
between states 1 and 3 as well as between states 2 and 4. Whether to move or stay should 
be based on which state is more preferred. For example, from state 1, DM 1 can 
unilaterally move to state 3. The preference of state 1 is more preferred (M) while the 
preference of state 3 is much more preferred (MM). To compare the two preferences, one 
uses equations 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8, and represents each triangular fuzzy set with its middle 
value (the most probable value, equations 1 through 5). From Figure 3.1, while the 
middle value for M is 0.7, the middle value for MM is 1. The membership of M to the 
indifferent and more preferred fuzzy set is 0.2 and 0.4, respectively. Since M belongs to 
the more preferred fuzzy set with a higher membership, the preference is said to be more 
preferred rather than indifferent. Likewise, the MM belongs to the more preferred fuzzy 
set with a membership of 1.0. Notice that both preferences belong to the set of more 
preferred states but with different memberships. Hence, state 3 is more preferred to state 




same fuzzy set (more preferred), one could conclude that state 3 is weakly stable and 
denoted as “weak”. Also, from state 2, DM 1 can move to state 4. The preference of state 
2 is L while the preference of state 4 is Indifferent (I). L belongs to the less preferred and 
indifferent fuzzy sets with a memberships of 0.4 and 0.2, respectively. Hence, L is more 
represented by the less preferred fuzzy set. In a similar way, I belongs to the less 
preferred, indifferent, and more preferred fuzzy sets with memberships of 0, 1.0, and 0, 
respectively. Hence, I is represented by the indifferent fuzzy set. Since I belongs to the 
indifferent set with a membership of 1.0, it is more preferred to the L.  Therefore, state 2 
is not Nash stable for DM 1. Since both states 1 and 4 belong to two adjacent fuzzy sets 
that overlap, state 4 is weakly stable. The entire results of the Nash stability analysis for 
the two DMs are displayed in Table 3.3.  
 
 
Table 3.3: Prisoner's Dilemma Nash stability using ordinal preferences. 
  DM 2 





















From Table 3.3, it is easy to notice that state 4 constitutes an equilibrium since it 
is stable for both DMs. Since it is weakly stable for both DMs, one could conclude that it 






3.8.2 General Metarational Stability (GMR) 
A state is general metarationally stable for a DM i iff for each unilateral improvement 
(UI), there is a credible sanction by the opponent DM j. In other words, if DM i tries to 
improve from the current state, the opponent j can move to a new state that is less 
preferred by DM i when compared to the original state regardless of its preference by 
DM j. 
For example, from state 1, DM 1 can improve by moving to state 3 (it is a UI as 
shown in the calculations for Nash stability). From state 3, DM 2 can move to state 4. As 
per the definition for the general metarational stability, this move is allowed regardless of 
its payoff for DM 2 as far as it could sanction DM 1. DM 2 will move to state 4 to 
sanction DM 1. Now the preference of state 4 has to be compared to the preference of 
state 1 (original state) with respect to DM 1. As shown in Table 3.2, the preferences of 
states 1 and 4 for DM 1 are M and I, respectively. M belongs to the more preferred set 
with a membership of 0.4 (see calculations for Nash stability) while I belongs to the 
indifferent set with a membership of 1.0. Therefore, state 1 is more preferred to state 4 
with respect to DM 1. Hence, state 1 is general metarationally stable for DM 1. Since 
both states 1 and 4 belong to two adjacent overlapping sets, one could conclude that it 
possesses a weak general metarational stability. The entire general metarational stability 







Table 3.4: Prisoner's Dilemma general metarational stability using ordinal preferences. 
  DM 2 






















From Table 3.4, one can see that states 1 and 4 are general metarationally stable 
for both DMs and hence constitute an equilibrium. Both states constitute a weak general 
metarational equilibrium and are elements of the set SWGMR. 
3.8.3 Symmetric Metarational Stability (SMR) 
A state is symmetric metarationally stable for a DM i iff for each unilateral improvement 
(UI), there is a credible sanction by the opponent DM j which is inescapable by a 
countermove by DM i. In other words, if DM i tries to improve from the current state, the 
opponent j can also move to a new state, regardless of its payoff for DM j, that is less 
preferred by DM i when compared to the original state and inescapable by a countermove 
by DM i. 
 For example, from state 1, DM 1 can improve by moving to state 3 (it is a UI as 
shown in the calculations for Nash stability). From state 3, DM 2 can move to state 4. 
Now the preference of state 4 has to be compared to the preference of state 1 (original 
state) with respect to DM 1. As shown in Table 3.2, the preferences of states 1 and 4 for 
DM 1 are M and I, respectively. M belongs to the more preferred set with a membership 
of 0.4 while I belongs to the indifferent set with a membership of 1.0. Therefore, state 1 




state 2 which is not a UI.  Hence, state 1 is symmetric metarationally stable for DM 1. 
Since both states 1 and 4 belong to two adjacent overlapping fuzzy sets (indifferent and 
more preferred), one could conclude that it possesses a weak symmetric metarational 
stability. The entire sequential stability analysis is shown in Table 3.5.  
 
Table 3.5: Prisoner's Dilemma symmetric metarational stability using ordinal preferences. 
  DM 2 






















From Table 3.5, one can see that states 1 and 4 are symmetric metarationally 
stable for both DMs and hence constitute an equilibrium. Both states constitute a weak 
symmetric metarational equilibrium and are elements of the set SWSMR. 
3.8.4 Sequential Stability (SEQ) 
A state is sequentially stable for a DM i iff for each unilateral improvement (UI), there is 
a credible sanction by the opponent DM j. In other words, if DM i tries to improve from 
the current state, the opponent j can also improve to a new state that is less preferred by 
DM i when compared to the original state. 
 For example, from state 1, DM 1 can improve by moving to state 3 (it is a UI as 
shown in the calculations for Nash stability). From state 3, DM 2 can move to state 4. As 
per the definition for the sequential stability, this move is allowed only if it is a UI for 
DM 2. With respect to DM 2, the preference of state 4 is I while the preference of state 3 




less preferred sets with memberships of 1.0 and 0.4, respectively.  Hence, I is more 
preferred to L and moving to state 4 is considered a UI for DM 2. Now the preference of 
state 4 has to be compared to the preference of state 1 (original state) with respect to DM 
1. As shown in the calculation for the symmetric metarationality, state 1 is more preferred 
to state 4 with respect to DM 1. Hence, state 1 is sequentially stable for DM 1. Since both 
states 1 and 4 belong to two adjacent overlapping sets, one could conclude that it 
possesses a weak sequential stability. The entire sequential stability analysis is shown in 
Table 3.6.  
Table 3.6: Prisoner's Dilemma sequential stability using ordinal preferences. 
  DM 2 






















From Table 3.6, one can see that states 1 and 4 are sequentially stable for both 
DMs and hence constitute an equilibrium. Both states constitute a weak sequential 
equilibrium and are elements of the set SWSEQ. 
 
3.9 Cardinal Case 
Assuming that the real payoffs of the states are known, each DM must decide whether or 
not to cooperate based on the cardinal preference values for each state. The cardinal 
payoffs for both DMs are shown in Table 3.1 (lower values in each cell). The normalized 




Table 3.7: Prisoner’s Dilemma in normal form using normalized cardinal values. 
  DM 2 























3.9.1 Nash Stability 
From state 1, DM 1 can move to state 3. The payoff of state 1 is 0.6 while the payoff of 
state 3 is 1.0. Using equations 6, 7, and 8, while 1.0 belongs to the more preferred set 
with a membership of 1.0, 0.6 belongs to the indifferent and more preferred sets with 
memberships of 0.6 and 0.2, respectively. Hence, state 3 is more preferred to state 1 and 
state 1 is not Nash stable with respect to DM 1. Also, from state 2, DM 1 can move to 
state 4. The payoff of state 2 is 0.1 while the payoff of state 4 is 0.3. While state 2 has a 
membership of 0.8 to the less preferred set, state 4 has memberships of 0.4 and 0.2 to the 
less preferred and indifferent sets, respectively. Both states 2 and 4 belong to the less 
preferred set but with different memberships, 0.8 and 0.4, respectively, but state 4 is more 
preferred since it belongs to the set with a smaller membership. Hence, state 2 is not Nash 
stable for DM 1. The entire results of the Nash stability analysis for the two DMs are 








Table 3.8: Prisoner's Dilemma Nash stability using cardinal values. 
  DM 2 






















From Table 3.8, it is easy to see that state 4 constitutes a weak Nash equilibrium 
and is therefore an element of SWNash since it is weakly stable for both DMs.  
3.9.2 General Metarational Stability (GMR) 
From state 1, DM 1 can unilaterally improve by moving to state 3. From state 3, DM 2 
can move to state 4. Now the payoff of state 4 has to be compared to state 1 (original 
state) with respect to DM 1. As shown in Table 3.7, the payoffs of states 1 and 4 for DM 
1 are 0.6 and 0.3, respectively. State 1 belongs to the indifferent set with a membership of 
0.6 and state 4 belongs to the less preferred set with a membership of 0.4. Hence, state 4 
is less preferred when compared to state 1 with respect to DM 1.  Since the two states 
belong to two adjacent overlapping fuzzy sets (less and indifferent), the preference 
structure in this case is said to be weak preference. Therefore, state 1 is weakly general 
metarationally stable for DM 1. The entire general metarational stability analysis is 








Table 3.9: Prisoner's Dilemma general metarational stability using cardinal values. 
  DM 2 






















From Table 3.9, one can see that states 1 and 4 are sequentially stable for both 
DMs and hence constitute equilibria. Both states 1 and state 4 constitute weak equilibria. 
3.9.3 Symmetric Metarational Stability (SMR) 
From state 1, DM 1 can unilaterally improve by moving to state 3. From state 3, DM 2 
can move to state 4. Now the payoff of state 4 has to be compared to state 1 (original 
state) with respect to DM 1. As shown in Table 3.7, the payoffs of states 1 and 4 for DM 
1 are 0.6 and 0.3, respectively. State 1 belongs to the indifferent set with a membership of 
0.6 and state 4 belongs to the less preferred set with a membership of 0.4. Hence, state 4 
is less preferred when compared to state 1 with respect to DM 1 and this sanction is not 
escapable since DM 1 can only move to state 2 which is not a UI for DM 1. Since the two 
states belong to two adjacent overlapping fuzzy sets (less preferred and indifferent), the 
preference structure in this case is said to be weak preference. Therefore, state 1 is 
weakly symmetric metarationally stable for DM 1. The entire sequential stability analysis 










Table 3.10: Prisoner's Dilemma symmetric metarational stability using cardinal values. 
  DM 2 






















From Table 3.10, one can see that states 1 and 4 are symmetric metarationally 
stable for both DMs and hence constitute equilibria. Both states 1 and 4 constitute weak 
equilibria. 
3.9.4 Sequential Stability (SEQ) 
From state 1, DM 1 can unilaterally improve by moving to state 3. From state 3, DM 2 
can move to state 4 where this move is allowed only if it is a UI for DM 2. With respect 
to DM 2, the payoff of state 4 is 0.3 while the payoff of state 3 is 0.1. The memberships 
of 0.3 and 0.1 are (0.3) 0.4LPμ = and (0.1) 0.8,LPμ = respectively.  Hence, state 4 belongs to 
the less preferred set with a smaller membership and therefore moving to this state is 
considered a UI for DM 2. Now the payoff of state 4 has to be compared to state 1 
(original state) with respect to DM 1. As shown in Table 3.7, the payoffs of states 1 and 4 
for DM 1 are 0.6 and 0.3, respectively. State 1 belongs to the indifferent set with a 
membership of 0.6 and state 4 belongs to the less preferred set with a membership of 0.4. 
Hence, state 4 is less preferred when compared to state 1 with respect to DM 1.  Since the 
two states belong to two adjacent overlapping fuzzy sets (less preferred and indifferent), 




weakly sequential stable for DM 1. The entire sequential stability analysis is shown in 
Table 3.11. 
Table 3.11: Prisoner's Dilemma sequential stability using cardinal values. 
  DM 2 






















From Table 3.11, one can see that states 1 and 4 are sequentially stable for both 
DMs and hence constitute weak equilibria. 
Table 3.12 summarizes the entire stability analysis for Prisoner’s Dilemma using 
the fuzzy approach for both the ordinal and the cardinal cases. In this table, DM 1, and 
DM 2, and E refer to prisoner 1, prisoner 2, and equilibrium, respectively. The 
equilibrium states are classified as weak or strong equilibrium. The equilibrium could be 













Table 3.12: Prisoner's Dilemma fuzzy stability analysis. 
Ordinal Cardinal Stability 
Type 
State 
 DM 1 DM 2 E DM 1 DM 2 E 
1 Unstable Unstable  Unstable Unstable  
2 Unstable Weak  Unstable Weak  
3 Weak Unstable  Weak Unstable  N
as
h 
4 Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak 
1 Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak 
2 Unstable Weak  Unstable Weak  




4 Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak 
1 Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak 
2 Unstable Weak  Unstable Weak  
3 Weak Unstable  Weak Unstable  SM
R
 
4 Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak 
1 Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak 
2 Unstable Weak  Unstable Weak  
3 Weak Unstable  Weak Unstable  SE
Q
 




A new fuzzy preference structure is proposed to deal with situations in which the 
preferences of the DM are fuzzy or uncertain. Four solution concepts, Nash, general 
metarational, symmetric metarational, and sequential stabilities, are redefined to 
accommodate the fuzziness in preferences for a two-DM conflict. The proposed fuzzy 
approach is applied to the game of Prisoners’ Dilemma.  The application demonstrates 
the effectiveness of the fuzzy approach in modeling conflicts with fuzzy preferences. 
More specifically, it gives a more realistic way of analyzing the behavior of individuals 
involved in a conflict, especially when the preferences are vague or imprecise. Using the 
fuzzy approach allows the preferences to vary within ranges rather than just being single 
crisp values. Whenever the cardinal preferences are not known, they can be approximated 
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using some linguistic variables. It also allows a DM to consider both the ordinal and 
cardinal preferences. Overall, the fuzzy approach preference methodology is a more 
flexible framework for analyzing conflicts with imprecise preferences. In Chapter 4, the 

























Uncertain Preferences in Conflicts 
with Multiple Participants 
While in a 2-DM conflicts, one needs to take into account potential responses by the 
other opponent; in n-DM conflicts, one must consider a move or group of moves by more 
than one opponent. In this chapter, the new definitions introduced in chapter 3 are 
extended for use with n-DM conflicts, where 2.n ≥  Also, the concepts of group 
unilateral movement (UM) and group unilateral improvement (UI) are introduced. To 
demonstrate the applicability of the newly proposed definitions, they are applied to an 
aquifer contamination conflict.  
 
4.1 n-DM Case 
The assessment of the stability of an n-DM model requires the examination of all the 
possible responses by all other DMs to a certain move by a DM i N∈ (stability 
definitions for n-DMs are given in Chapter 2). Defining the concept of an allowable 
sanction, a key concept in GMR, SMR, and SEQ stability, is the first step in this 
direction. 
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 Suppose that , ,H N H φ⊆ ≠  is any non-empty subset of DMs, and a state .s S∈  
Starting at a state s, ( )HR s S⊆ refers to the set of states that can result from group 
unilateral moves (UMs) by H. It is important to note that a DM in H may move more than 
once but never two moves successively. If 1 ( ),Hs R s∈ then 1( , )H s sΩ  will refer to the set 
of all last DMs in any allowable sequence of moves by H from s to s1.  
Definition 4.1.1: Let s S∈ and ,H N⊆ .H φ≠  A UM from s by H is a member of 
( ) ,HR s S⊆  and is defined inductively by: 
1. If i H∈ and 1 ( ),is R s∈  then 1 ( )Hs R s∈  and 1( , ).Hi s s∈Ω   
2. If 1 ( ),Hs R s∈ ,i H∈  and 2 1( ),is R s∈  then 
a. If 1( , ) 1H s sΩ =  and 1( , ),Hi s s∉Ω then 2 ( )Hs R s∈  and 2( , ).Hi s s∈Ω  
b. If 1( , ) 1,H s sΩ  then 2 ( )Hs R s∈  and 2( , ).Hi s s∈Ω  
( )HR s and ( ) ( )
M MM
H HR s R s∪  could be thought of as H’s UMs and UIs from state 
s, respectively.  
The reachable list could be attained either by adding states that are single moves 
from s or adding states that are group moves by some or all DMs in the set H moving 
sequentially. The set of all group UIs for H from s will be denoted by 
( ( ) ( ))M MMH HR s R s S∪ ⊆  where ( )
M
HR s  and ( )
MM
HR s  refer to the set of more and much 
more preferred states by H from state s. 
Definition 4.1.2: Let s S∈ and ,H N⊆  .H φ≠  A UI from s by H is a member of 
( ( ) ( ))M MMH HR s R s S∪ ⊆ and is defined inductively by: 
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1. If i H∈  and 1 ( ) ( ),
M MM
i is R s R s∈ ∪  then 1 ( ) ( )
M MM
H Hs R s R s∈ ∪  and 
1 1( , ) ( , ).
M MM
H Hi s s s s∈Ω ∪Ω  
2. If 1 ( ) ( ),
M MM
H Hs R s R s∈ ∪ ,i H∈  and 2 1 1( ) ( ),
M MM
i is R s R s∈ ∪  then 
a. If 1 1( , ) ( , ) 1
M MM
H Hs s s sΩ ∪Ω =  and 1 1( , ) ( , ),
M MM
H Hi s s s s∉Ω ∪Ω then 
2 ( ) ( )
M MM
H Hs R s R s∈ ∪  and 2 2( , ) ( , ).
M MM
H Hi s s s s∈Ω ∪Ω  
b. If 1 1( , ) ( , ) 1,
M MM
H Hs s s sΩ ∪Ω >  then 2 ( ) ( )
M MM
H Hs R s R s∈ ∪  and 
2 2( , ) ( , ).
M MM
H Hi s s s s∈Ω ∪Ω  
( )N iR s−  and ( ) ( )
M MM
N i N iR s R s− −∪  represent the group UMs and UIs from state s, 
respectively by DM i’s opponents. ( ) ( )M MMH HR s R s∪  could be attained by either adding 
states that are single UIs from s or adding states that are group UIs by some or all DMs in 
the set H. 
Definition 4.1.3 Strong Nash stability (SNash): For DM ,i N∈  a state s S∈ is 
strongly Nash stable for DM i, denoted by ,SNashis S∈  iff ( ) ( )
M MM
i iR s R s φ∪ =  and 
( )MMi ks s∈Φ  for all ks  where ks  is any state k from which DM i can unilaterally reach 
state s in one step.  
A state s is said to be strongly Nash stable for a particular DM i iff i has no UIs 
from state s and s is much more preferred to all other states reachable from state s by DM 
i. In other words, the preference for state s doesn’t belong to the same fuzzy set or an 
adjacent overlapping set representing the preference for the remaining reachable states.  
Since Nash stability doesn’t take into consideration countermoves by any other DM, this 
definition holds for 2-DMs and any 2.N ≥  
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Definition 4.1.4 Weak Nash stability (WNash): For DM ,i N∈  a state s S∈  is 
weakly Nash stable for DM i, denoted by ( ),WNashis S s∈  iff ( ) ( )
M MM
i iR s R s φ∪ =  and for 
all ks for which ( ) ( ) ( )
MM M I
i k i k i ks s s s∈Φ ∪Φ ∪Φ  there exists at least one ks  such that 
( ) ( )M Ii k i ks s s∈Φ ∪Φ  where ks  is any state k from which DM i can unilaterally reach 
state s in one step.  
A state s is said to be weakly Nash stable for a particular DM i iff i has no UIs 
from a state s and s is more preferred to all other states reachable from state s. Hence, the 
preference for state s could belong to the same fuzzy set or an adjacent overlapping set 
representing the fuzzy preference for one of the states reachable from s. Since Nash 
stability doesn’t take into consideration the countermoves by any other DM, this 
definition holds for 2-DMs and any 2.N ≥  
Definition 4.1.5 Nash stability (Nash): The set of Nash stable states for DM i is 
.Nash SNash WNashi i iS S S= ∪  
Definition 4.1.6 General metarationality (GMR): For DM ,i N∈  a state s S∈ is 
general metarationally stable for DM i, denoted by ,GMRis S∈  iff for every 
1 ( ) ( )
M MM
i is R s R s∈ ∪  there exists 1( )k N is R s−∈  such that 
( ) ( ) ( ).I L MLk i i is s s s∈Φ ∪Φ ∪Φ   
Hence, every potential UI by DM i can be sanctioned by a move by the opponents 
N i− regardless of 'N i s− preferences. For the situation in which DM i has no UI from 
state s, the state is Nash stable which also implies GMR stability.   
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Definition 4.1.7 Strong general metarationality (SGMR): For DM ,i N∈  a state 
s S∈ is strongly general metarationally stable for DM i, denoted by ,SGMRis S∈  iff 
GMR
is S∈  and for every 1 ( ) ( )
M MM
i is R s R s∈ ∪  there exists 1( )k N is R s−∈  such that 
( ).MLk is s∈Φ  
Therefore, every potential UI by DM i can be strongly sanctioned by a move 
levied by the opponents N i− regardless 'N i s−  preferences. For the case in which DM 
i has no UI from state s, SGMR is defined to exist only if state s is strongly Nash stable. 
Definition 4.1.8 Weak general metarationality (WGMR): For DM ,i N∈  a state 
s S∈ is weakly general metarationally stable for DM i, denoted by ,WGMRis S∈  iff 
GMR
is S∈  and for at least one 1 ( ) ( ),
M MM
i is R s R s∈ ∪  1( ) ( ) .
ML
N i iR s s φ− ∩Φ =   
Every potential UI by DM i can be sanctioned but there is at least one UI by DM i 
that can only be weakly sanctioned by .N i−  For the situation in which DM i has no UI 
from state s, WGMR is defined to exist only if state s is weakly Nash stable.  
Definition 4.1.9 Symmetric metarationality (SMR): For DM ,i N∈  a state s S∈ is 
symmetric metarationally stable for DM i, denoted by ,SMRis S∈  iff for every 
1 ( ) ( )
M MM
i is R s R s∈ ∪ there exists 1( )k N is R s−∈  such that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).I L MLk i k i i is R s s s s∪ ⊆ Φ ∪Φ Φ   
Accordingly, every potential UI by DM i can be sanctioned by a move levied by 
N i− regardless of 'N i s− preferences, and DM i cannot escape from this sanction by a 
countermove. For the situation in which DM i  has no UI from state s, the state is Nash 
stable which also implies SMR stability. 
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Definition 4.1.10 Strong symmetric metarationality (SSMR): For DM ,i N∈  a state 
s S∈ is strongly symmetric metarationally stable for DM i, denoted by ,SSMRis S∈  iff 
SMR
is S∈  and for every 1 ( ) ( )
M MM
i is R s R s∈ ∪ there exists 1( )k N is R s−∈  such that 
( ) ( ).MLk i k is R s s∪ ⊆Φ   
Every potential UI by DM i can be strongly sanctioned by a move levied by 
N i− regardless of 'N i s− preference, and DM i cannot escape from this sanction by a 
countermove. For the case where DM i has no UI from state s, SSMR is defined to exist 
only if state s is strongly Nash stable. 
Definition 4.1.11 Weak symmetric metarationality (WSMR): For DM ,i N∈  a state 
s S∈ is weakly symmetric metarationally stable for DM i, denoted by ,WSMRis S∈  iff 
SMR
is S∈  and for at least one 1 ( ) ( ),
M MM
i is R s R s∈ ∪  the following condition must holds: 
There exists { } 1( ),k N is R s−⊆  but for at least one 1 ( ) ( ),M MMi is R s R s∈ ∪  
( ) ( )MLk i k is R s s∪ ⊄Φ   where ks is any state k from which DM i can unilaterally reach 
state s in one step.  
At least one potential UI by DM i can be strongly sanctioned by a move levied by 
N i− but a countermove by DM i  will weaken the sanction or the sanction is weak in the 
first place but it is inescapable by DM i. For the situation in which DM i has no UI from 
state s, WSMR is defined to exist only if state s is weakly Nash stable.   
Definition 4.1.12 Sequential stability (SEQ): For DM ,i N∈  a state s S∈ is 
sequentially stable for DM i, denoted by ,SEQis S∈  iff for every 1 ( ) ( )
M MM
i is R s R s∈ ∪  
there exists { } 1 1( ) ( )M MMk N i N is R s R s− −⊆ ∪  such that ( ) ( ) ( ).I L MLk i i is s s s∈Φ ∪Φ Φ   
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Every potential UI by DM i can be sanctioned by a UI levied by .N i−  For the 
situation in which DM i has no UI from state s, the state is Nash stable which also implies 
SEQ stability.   
Definition 4.1.13 Strong sequential stability (SSEQ): For DM ,i N∈  a state s S∈ is 
strongly sequentially stable for DM i, denoted by ,SSEQis S∈  iff 
SEQ
is S∈  and for every 
1 ( ) ( )
M MM
i is R s R s∈ ∪  there exists { } 1 1( ) ( )M MMk N i N is R s R s− −⊆ ∪  such that ( ).MLk is s∈Φ   
 Hence, every potential UI by DM i can be strongly sanctioned by the opponent 
N i− UIs. For the case in which DM i has no UI from state s, SSEQ is defined to exist 
only if state s is strongly Nash stable.  
 
Definition 4.1.14 Weak sequential stability (WSEQ): For DM ,i N∈  a state s S∈ is 
weakly sequentially stable for DM i, denoted by ,WSEQis S∈  iff 
SEQ
is S∈  and for at least 
one 1 ( ) ( ),
M MM
i is R s R s∈ ∪  ( )1 1( ) ( ) ( ) .M MM MLN i N i iR s R s s φ− −∪ ∩Φ =   
Hence, at least one UI by DM i does not produce a much less preferred state as a 
result of a credible sanction by the opponent .N i−  For the situation in which DM i has 
no UI from state s, WSEQ is defined to exist only if state s is weakly Nash stable.   
 
4.2 Groundwater Contamination Conflict 
In a rich agricultural land in Southern Ontario, Canada, the town of Elmira is situated 
about 15 kilometers north of the twin cities of Kitchener and Waterloo (see Figure 4.1). It 
is a prosperous town that is famous for its annual maple syrup festival which is the largest 
in the world. The main water supplies for the 7400 residences of this small town come 
 64
mainly from an underground aquifer. In the year 1989, the Ontario Ministry of 
Environment (MoE), noticed that the water supplies were contaminated with N-nitroso 
demethylamine (NDMA). Owning a pesticide and rubber plant in the town and known for 
its bad environmental records, Uniroyal Chemical Ltd (UR) was the main suspect. A 
Control Order was issued by the MoE requesting UR to implement a long term collection 
and treatment system. UR cooperation was important in the determination of the cause as 
well as the best way to cleanse the contaminated aquifer and to carry out the necessary 
cleaning actions under the supervision of MoE. UR immediately exercised its right to 
appeal in order to lengthen the process hoping that the Control Order would be canceled 
or at least modified. The Township of Woolwich and the Regional Municipality of 
Waterloo (referred to as Local Government or LG for short) were encouraged by their 
citizens to take a strong position in the dispute. The main decision makers (DMs) 
involved in this conflict have different objectives which might seem contradicting at 
some points of time. While the MoE wants to carry out its responsibilities in an effective 
and efficient way, the UR would like the Control Order to be lifted or modified. On the 
other hand, the local government wants to protect its citizens and industrial base (Hipel et 
al., 1993; Kilgour et al., 2001). 
 Table 4.1 shows the main DMs and their options. The Control Order has already 
been issued by the MoE but it can still modify it to make it more favorable to UR. For its 
part, UR can exercise its right to appeal and gain more time, accept the original Control 
Order as is, or just simply abandon its operations in Elmira. In order to protect its citizens 
and its industrial base, the LG would insist on the application of the original Control 





















Figure 4.1: Location and map of Elmira. 
 





















Table 4.1: Decision makers and their options in the Elmira Conflict. 
Decision Maker Options 
Ministry of Environment (MoE) 1. Modify the Control Order to make it more 
acceptable for UR 
Uniroyal Chemical Ltd (UR) 2. Delay lengthen the appeal process 
 3. Accept the original Control Order 
 4. Abandon the Elmira operations 
Local Government (LG) 5. Insist that the original Control Order be applied 
 
 
Only 9 states are feasible out of 32 possible states. The situation where UR 
accepts the Control Order or appeals it and at the same time abandons its operations in 
Elmira is an example of a possible state but not a feasible one. Table 4.2 lists the 
complete set of feasible states. For simplicity, the feasible states have been numbered 1 
through 9. A “Y” besides an option for a particular DM means that the DM chose that 
option. On the other hand, an “N” besides an option for a particular DM means that the 
DM decided not to choose that option. When having a “–“ besides an option, it means 
either a “Y” or a “N”, because it actually doesn’t make a difference whether it is a “Y” or 
an “N”. To illustrate such a situation, when UR decides to abandon its operations in 
Elmira, it doesn’t make a difference what other options are selected by any of the 








Table 4.2: Feasible states in the Elmira Conflict. 
DM Options 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
MoE 1. Modify N Y N Y N Y N Y –  
UR 2. Delay Y Y N N Y Y N N – 
 3. Accept N N Y Y N N Y Y – 
 4. Abandon N N N N N N N N Y 
LG 5. Insist N N N N Y Y Y Y – 
 
The preferences of all the DMs over all the possible states are shown in Table 4.3. 
Assuming that the cardinal or actual payoffs of the states are not known, each DM must 
express his/her relative preference for each state using some linguistic terms from Figure 
1 where ML, L, I, M, and MM refer to much less, less, indifferent, more, and much more, 
respectively. 
Figure 4.2 summarizes the entire Elmira Conflict in what is called an integrated 
graph model defined within the paradigm of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution 
(Fang et al., 1993). It shows all the DMs (labels on the arrows), the feasible states (circled 
numbers), and the allowable moves by each DM between the different feasible states 
(directed arrows). For example, state 7 is the much more preferred by both MoE and LG 
while for UR, state 7 is less preferred. From this state, MoE can only move in one 
direction towards state 8 (irreversible move represented by a one-sided arrow). Likewise, 
UR can move from state 7 in an irreversible fashion to state 9. All of the moves in this 





















Figure 4.2: Integrated graph of the Elmira Conflict. 
 
 
Table 4.3: Preferences for each decision maker. 
State 
DM 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
MoE I L MM M I L MM M ML 
UR MM ML L MM M ML L M I 
LG L L MM I M L MM I ML 
 
Doing the analysis manually or using the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution 
software called GMCR II (see (Fange et al., 2003a, 2003b) for more details), the 
equilibrium points are states 4, 5, 8, and 9. For example, from state 5, MoE can 
unilaterally move to state 6. While the preference for state 5 is I, the preference for state 6 
is L. I and L belong to the indifferent and less preferred sets with memberships of 1.0 and 
0.4, respectively. Hence, state 5 is more preferred to state 6 and moving to state 6 is not a 
UI for MoE. Therefore, state 5 is Nash stable for MoE. Since the preference for the two 
states belongs to two adjacent overlapping fuzzy sets, the preference is weak. Hence, 
state 5 is also a weak GMR, SMR, and SEQ as per the definitions for those solution 
concepts. Table 4.5 shows the complete stability analysis for the conflict. State 9 is 


















LG LG LG LG 
UR 
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equilibrium points. On the other hand, states 5 and 8 are strongly stable for a single DM 
namely LG and MoE, respectively. State 4 is the strongest equilibrium as it is strongly 
stable for both MoE and UR. State 4 represents a possible resolution for the conflict 
where the MoE modifies the Control Order to make it more favorable for UR which will 
accept it without any pressure from LG to apply the original one. However, one knows 
from the conflict literature that LG is pushed by its local citizens to insist on the 
application of the original control order. Therefore, equilibria at states 5 and 8 are more 
probable than at state 4.  
As depicted in Figure 4.2, it is not possible for any of them to move from state 5 
to state 8 on an individual basis. In order to reach state 8, a transition is required either 
through state 6 or state 7. If MoE moves first to state 6, which is much less preferred by 
UR, and, subsequently, UR can move from state 6 to state 4.  If UR moves first to state 7, 
which is less preferred by UR but more preferred by both MoE and LG, MoE needs to 




Figure 4.3: State transitions between states 5 and 8. 
 
 
Table 4.5 shows the evolution of the Elmira conflict from the status quo, to a 
transitional state and ultimately to a final equilibrium. The status quo is state number 1 
which is the most preferred state for UR but less preferred by both MoE and LG. As 
indicated by the arrow connecting states 5 and 6 in Table 4.5, MoE can unilaterally cause 
the conflict to move from state 5 to 6 by changing its strategy from insisting that the 
original Control Order be adopted to modifying it to make it more favorable to UR. From 
state number 6, UR will move to state 8 which is more preferred by all DMs. 
 Alternatively, UR could move from state 5 to state 7 as indicated in the bottom of 
Table 4.5 by changing its strategy to accepting the Control Order. Meanwhile, MoE will 
modify the original Control Order to make it more favorable to UR and this will cause the 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
MoE Weak Weak Weak Strong Weak Weak Weak Strong Weak
UR Strong Unstable Unstable Strong Weak Unstable Unstable Weak Weak
LG Unstable Weak Weak Weak Strong Weak Weak Weak Weak





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
MoE Weak Weak Weak Strong Weak Weak Weak Strong Weak
UR Strong Unstable Unstable Strong Weak Unstable Unstable Weak Weak
LG Weak Weak Weak Weak Strong Weak Weak Weak Weak





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
MoE Weak Weak Weak Strong Weak Weak Weak Strong Weak
UR Strong Unstable Unstable Strong Weak Unstable Unstable Weak Weak
LG Weak Weak Weak Weak Strong Weak Weak Weak Weak





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
MoE Weak Weak Weak Strong Weak Weak Weak Strong Weak
UR Strong Unstable Unstable Strong Weak Unstable Unstable Weak Weak
LG Unstable Weak Weak Weak Strong Weak Weak Weak Weak









Table 4.5: Evolution of the Elmira Conflict. 
 Transition through state 6 





MoE: 1. Modify N  Y Y 
UR:   2. Delay Y Y  N 
          3. Accept N N  Y 
          4. Abandon N N N N 
LG:   5. Insist  Y Y Y 
State Number 1 5 6 8 
 Transition through state 7 





MoE: 1. Modify N N  Y Y 
UR:   2. Delay Y Y Y  N 
3. Accept N N N  Y 
4. Abandon N N N N 
LG:  5. Insist N  Y Y Y 




In the foregoing situation, MoE have an incentive not to carry out its obligation 
and move from the intermediate state 7 to the final state 8 as state 7 is more preferred by 






conflict to an end point which is state 9. As state 9 is not favorable by both MoE and LG, 
they will try reaching a compromise which is state 8 in this case. 
 
4.3 Summary 
The foregoing analysis of the groundwater contamination conflict in Elmira demonstrates 
the effectiveness of the new fuzzy preference structure in dealing with a situation in 
which the DM’s preferences are fuzzy or uncertain. The well-known solution concepts of 
Nash, general metarational, symmetric metarational, and sequential stability, were 
modified to accommodate preference fuzziness for multiple decision-maker conflicts. 
Despite the preferences’ fuzziness, one needs to express his or her preferences over a set 
of states or course of actions hoping for a better or more rewarding strategic result.  More 
specifically, it gives a more realistic way of analyzing the behavior of individuals 
involved in a conflict, especially when the preferences are vague or imprecise. Using this 
approach, whenever the preferences are not known for sure, they could vary within 
ranges rather than just being single crisp values. For the case where the cardinal 
preferences are not known, they can be approximated using linguistic variables. Hence, 
the methodology also allows a DM to consider both the ordinal and cardinal cases. In 
conclusion, using the new fuzzy approach along with the newly redefined solution 
concepts provides a more flexible framework for analyzing conflicts having imprecise 
preferences. In Chapter 5, a thorough review of trust models is carried out to reveal their 




Assessment of Trust Research 
Trust decisions are risky due to the uncertainties and the loss of control. On the other 
hand, not trusting might mean giving up some potential benefits. The advances in 
electronic transactions, mutliagent systems, and decision support systems create a 
necessity to develop trust and reputation models. The development of such models will 
allow for trust reasoning and decisions to be made in situations with high risk and 
uncertainty. In recent years, several attempts have been made to model reputation and 
trust. However, perceiving trust differently and the lack of having a unified trust 
definition are among the main causes of the proliferation of many trust models across 
different disciplines. A thorough review of trust models is carried out in this chapter to 
reveal their key capabilities and compare how they differ among disciplines.  
 
5.1 Overview 
Despite its usefulness in both human and artificial societies, trust was and will still be a 
risky proposition.Trust has been always an integral component of human social life and 
actions. The advances in autonomous intelligent systems, communications, and electronic 
transactions motivated the execution of research regarding trust and reputation in order to 
span the spatial and temporal separation among the partners involved in a social 
interaction or an exchange of a commodity or goods. 
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   Reputation is used as a means to build and update trust after a certain number of 
successful transactions (e-bay, 2002; Amazon, 2002; Dellarocas, 2003). Anonymity, 
uncertainty, risk, lack of control, and potential opportunism are key elements in most 
online transactions. Using trust evaluation and models to compensate for the lack of 
information and control in online environments will allow one to make decisions in 
regard to whom to trust and engage within a transaction or cooperative action. Some of 
the associated risks with online transactions include the exchange of some personal 
information, the absence of the physical goods, the non immediate exchange of goods 
and money, and how secure the transaction media is (Bhattacherjee, 2002; Einwiller et 
al., 2000; Einwiller and Will, 2001; Grabner-Krauter and Kaluscha, 2003).    
Trust is closely related to and tied up with uncertainty. In general, uncertainty is 
the absence of credible knowledge about future events. Trust is supposed to assure an 
agent that the desirable course of events will be realized in the unknowable future as if 
being guaranteed from past knowledge. As Luhmann (1979, p. 32) wrote, “trust rests on 
illusion. In actuality, there is less information available than would be required to give 
assurance of success. The actor willingly surmounts this deficit of information”. A 
trustful person can comprehend new experiences and carry out actions that have been 
previously undesirable or unachievable. This is due to the fact that when trusting, in 
favour of an inner confidence, one simplifies the complexity of the outer world and 
removes any uncertainties. 
When trusting, we allow ourselves to be vulnerable to others by depending on 
them to achieve or care for something we value. This interdependence relationship occurs 
when it is in the mutual benefit for both parties to fulfill their obligations towards the 
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achievement of their common goal. In this case, no party has a dominant power over the 
other. While engaging in a dependence relationship, none of the parties is willing to 
exploit its situation.  The realization of this dependency relationship by the trustee will 
put him or her in a relatively more powerful situation (Luhmann, 1979). If properly used, 
this kind of power will strengthen the trust relationship. Some trustees might refrain from 
using this power to avoid the negative consequences associated with exploiting the 
dependent trustor. 
 
5.2 Trust Definitions from Different Disciplines 
Different disciplines handle trust differently according to their own perceptions and what 
fits their specific goals. In order to consolidate sensible measures of trust, one needs to 
step back and analyze why different disciplines view trust differently. What follows is a 
thorough review of the existing trust definitions from different disciplines like, 
Psychology (Deutsch, 1973; Karlins and Abelson, 1970; Bromley,  1993; Rotter, 1967, 
1971; Lewicki and Bunker, 1995), Sociology (Buskens, 1998; Luhmann, 1979; Lahno, 
2001; Good, 2000; Sztompka, 1999; Gambetta, 2000), Philosophy (Plato, 1955; Hume, 
1975; Hardin, 2002; Baier, 1986; Cvetkovivh and Lofstedt, 1999), Economics (Celenttani 
et al., 1966; Marimon et al., 2000; Granovetter, 1985; Zucker, 1986; Williamson, 1993), 
Finance (Guth, 2001; Ferrary, 2002), Marketing (Ganesan, 1994; Morgan and Hunt, 
1994; Doney and Cannon, 1997; Geyskens et al., 1997; Swan et al., 1999), Management 
(Mayer et al., 1995; Gill and Butler, 1996; Inkpen and Currall, 1998; McKnight et al., 
1998; Wicks et al., 1999; Luo, 2002), E-Commerce (Gefen, 2003, Gefen et al., 2003; 
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McKnight and Chervany, 2002; Jones, 2002), and Computer Science (Demolombe, 2001;  
Falcone and Castelfranci, 2001;  Bhattacherjee, 2002; Shankar et al., 2002; Pavlou, 2003)    
5.2.1 Trust in Psychology 
In his 1973 book, M. Deutsch defines trust as confidence that one will find what is 
desired from another person rather than what is feared. Many researchers find this 
definition to be a specific characteristic of a relationship. Deutsch, however, presents 
many other aspects of trust in his 1973 work. He presents trust as being connected to 
despair, innocence, social conformity, virtue, gambling, risk-taking and faith, among 
others. 
From a psychological perspective, risk in trust is approached as one of the 
characteristics of individuals. While some people are willing to take risks, there are 
others who are too cautious and distrustful to take any chances. Trusting behavior 
depends on how individuals perceive an ambiguous path or unclear situation. In such 
cases, the occurrence of a good or bad result is dependent on other’s actions. Knowing 
that a negative result is more harmful than a good one, a trusting decision should be 
made. 
The use of the word “perceive” in the previous paragraph is to emphasize the 
subjective nature of trust. If trust is based on individual perception, it is likely that the 
same situation will be seen differently by different individuals. Estimates of chances and 
expected gains or losses are subjective. Thus, some individuals might make unwise risks, 
thereby acting as if they are taking chances while, in fact, they are trusting unwisely. 
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5.2.2 Trust in Sociology 
The sociology of trust has been investigated from different angles: rational choices, 
culture, functionality, symbolic interaction, and others. Trust is a social relationship 
subject to its own special system of rules (Luhmann, 1979). Trust occurs within 
interactions that are influenced by both personality and social systems (Lahno, 2001). 
Most sociologists agree with: “the clear and simple fact that, without trust, the everyday 
social life which we take for granted is simply not possible” (Good, 2000, p. 32). We 
always find ourselves in a condition of uncertainty about and uncontrollability of future 
actions. We have no way of knowing and controlling what others will do independently 
of our own actions and we are not even sure how they will react to ours. In general, 
uncertainty and risk are integral components of human interactions that can’t be ignored 
or avoided.          
In situations in which we have to act in spite of uncertainty and risk, the third 
factor that comes to the fore is that of trust (Sztompka, 1999). Trusting becomes a crucial 
strategy for dealing with an uncertain and uncontrollable future. Since there is no way of 
knowing what is in the minds of others, we need trust to deal with an unknown future and 
others’ uncontrollable actions. 
When participating in uncertain and uncontrollable conditions, we take risks, we 
gamble, and we make bets about the future and the actions of the others. A simple and 
general definition of trust is: “trust is a bet about the future contingent actions of others” 
(Sztompka, 1999, p. 25). In this sense, trust consists of two main components: beliefs and 
commitments. First, it involves specific expectations: “trust is based on an individual’s 
theory as to how another person will perform on some future occasion” (Good, 2000, p. 
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33). When placing trust, we behave as if we know the future. Second, trust involves 
commitment through action or roughly speaking, placing a bet. Thus: “trust is the correct 
expectations about the actions of other people that have a bearing on one’s own choice of 
action when that action must be chosen before one can monitor the actions of those 
others” (Gambetta, 2000, p. 51). In order to have a better and deeper understanding of 
trust, we need to pay attention to the mental and subjective attitudes of the trusting 
person. It is important to focus on what happens in an individual’s mind when trusting 
someone else. 
5.2.3 Trust in Philosophy 
Trust and distrust are subjective attitudes that affect our thinking and feelings (Hardin, 
2002). When trusting, we are more likely to let ourselves be vulnerable to others and 
allow ourselves to depend on others. Trust is a cooperative activity in which we engage 
so that we can assist one another in the care of goods (Baier, 1986). We trust others when 
we afford them the opportunity to care for something we value. We trust things as well as 
people. While trusting things is based on the properties of the things that we know in 
advance, trusting people is based on past experiences. When we trust, we hold 
expectations toward another person. To expect is to look forward to something without 
anticipating disappointment. When holding expectations of another, we project into the 
future, making an inference about the sort of person someone is going to be in the future. 
When trusting, the expectations alone are not enough but we must anticipate that the 
other has good intentions and the ability to carry out what is expected of him or her.  
In order to trust someone, we need to have a sense of his or her values. A person 
who lacks commitment to any values or principles doesn’t give us the ability to predict 
 80
either good or bad intentions or treatment. Knowing the other’s values, commitments, 
and loyalty will help us to decide to what extent risk would be involved if we count on 
that person. We trust others more fully when we believe that they have positive feelings 
towards us personally and not just as members of some group. Trust is a risky business 
because people whom we trust can let us down and we are vulnerable to harm when they 
do so. It is important to accept the risks of trust and try to handle them rather than taking 
the simplistic view that trust is always good. Sometimes we trust too easily and risk a 
great deal in doing so (Cvetkovivh and Lofstedt, 1999; Hardin, 2002). Our trust is 
generally based on experiences with other people. On the basis of those experiences, we 
construct a characterization or picture of them but in reality they are free agents with 
different characterizations that go beyond our beliefs about them. 
5.2.4 Trust in Economics 
The study of trust and reputation in a free economy tries to address the relationship 
between trust and competition. By supplying quality goods at competitive prices, firms 
are building good reputations in order to secure their future market position and share. 
Firms will refrain from being concerned about the short-term profits when compared to 
building a good reputation and long-term profits thereafter.  
In free-markets economy, consumers are faced with the dilemma of getting 
quality good for the least prices from profit-maximizing entities (firms). The trade-off 
between the price of goods and their quality is bridged by means of good reputation and 
trust between the consumer and the goods’ providers. Some of the pioneers in this field 
are Shapiro (1983), Friedman (1960), Hayek (1974 and 1978), Rockoff (1975), Chang 
(1998), Chari and Kehoe (1990), Stokey (1991), Klein (1974), and Taub (1985, 1986).  
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5.2.5 Trust in Finance 
The allocation of financial resources to certain activities includes buying assets, 
investments, and loans. These activities, and all financial activities, in general, are 
associated with some risk and uncertainty due to one of the involved parties not honoring 
his or her obligations. For example, borrowing money for a specific investment is highly 
related to the future ability of the borrower to pay back the loan. This highly depends on 
the trustworthiness and the associated evaluation of risks. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
strongly believe that trust, reputation, and social bonds will always be present in such 
interactions. The formation of trust and what factors would affect it were a topic for 
research in finance. Hart (1987) studied trust within agency theory. Others, like Shapiro 
and Stiglitz (1984), investigated the ethical side of trust in terms of the reliability of one 
of the parties. This required importing some of the sociological concepts such as social 
capital and social networks (Granovetter, 1973, 1974, 1985, 1991). Guth and Kliemt 
(1994) analyzed the evolution of trust in a simple game of trust between a buyer and a 
seller. 
5.2.6 Trust in Marketing 
Studying trust relationship between a marketer and a customer is a key factor in the 
relationship between the two. Most of the research in this area focuses on the customer’s 
trust (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). The research of trust in marketing dates back to the 
1970s. Establishing a high level of trust in a marketing relationship allows the two parties 
to focus more on long lasting term benefits (Ganesan, 1994). Some of the developed 
marketing theories are based on trust (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). Trust could assume 
different phases like, the trust between the firm and its marketers, the marketers and the 
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customers, and the customers and the firm. These three trust phases interact and affect 
each other one way or another (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). This explains why most 
marketing researchers have included trust in their relationships channel models where a 
vendor provides a service or a good to a distributor who resells it to the end user 
(Geyskens, 1997). 
5.2.7 Trust in Management 
Different parties within an organization need to work together to accomplish specific 
goals at both the personal and the organizational levels. This often requires some 
teamwork and dependence on others to execute certain assigned tasks. Risk will be 
always present in such relationships due to a lack of knowledge to do a specific task or 
the unwillingness to do it (Mayer, 1995). The presence of trust will reduce the risks 
associated with group interactions. However, some of the problems associated with trust 
in such environments are: lack of a specific definition of trust, difficulties of defining the 
boundaries of each task, lack of well defined regulations governing the interactions 
between the different inter-organization parties, and the unclear relationship between 
trust antecedents and consequences. There are some studies suggesting that trust is highly 
influenced by factors of which some are individual and others are organizational. In his 
1998 work, Doney et al. suggested that social values and norms, besides behavioral 
attitudes, are key factors in trust. The length and the type of the relationship between the 
different parties within an organization and between the different organizations, the 
presence of previous interactions, and the interpersonal relations, if any, are other factors 
suggested by Inkpen and Currall (1997). Gill and Butler (1996) focused on the presence 
of some personal knowledge or quality for fulfilling some delegated tasks. Therefore, 
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they define trust as an elaboration from current qualities as the most reliable for attaining 
a future goal. Some hidden factors or mental processes could be accounted for in 
explaining the high levels of trust for entities interacting for the first time (McKnight et 
al., 1998). Trust leads to some interdependencies which will eventually involve some sort 
of sharing of the control and management of things we care for (Inkpen and Currall, 
1998). Nevertheless, trust has not been appreciated enough within the management field. 
This is in part because managers didn’t devote sufficient time, energy, or resources to 
creating it within their organizations or because they look at it as a matter of strategic 
choice (Wicks et al., 1999). 
5.2.8 Trust in E-Commerce 
Trust in electronic transactions goes beyond risk and uncertainty to include other factors 
such as lack of information, lack of control, ease of use, privacy and security issues. On-
line transactions and exchange relationships are not only characterized by uncertainty, but 
also by secrecy, lack of control and potential fraud, thereby making risk and trust crucial 
elements of electronic commerce. 
 The process of buying over the internet being perceived as risky, presents 
numerous risks for consumers during and after the transaction itself. Online firms may be 
located in different locations of the country or even in different countries. This requires a 
non-immediate exchange of information, goods, and money. As a result, some sensitive 
information is exchanged online like, personal and financial information. The limited 
history about the seller prior to the interaction adds to the risk and uncertainty involved in 
this transaction (Bhattacherjee, 2002; Gefen, 2003; Gefen et al., 2003). 
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Some of the system-dependent uncertainties go beyond the control of the parties 
involved in the transaction. These are environment related uncertainties which could be 
characterized as exogenous. Generally speaking, the concept of exogenous uncertainties 
refers to the uncertainties of the world (Hirshleifer and Riley, 1979). The environment 
dynamics and system complexity are two main factors when considering exogenous 
uncertainties (Brielmaier and Diller, 1995). In the context of electronic commerce, 
exogenous uncertainty relates to the potential technological errors or security gaps that 
can’t be avoided. The utilization of encrypted transactions, firewalls, authentication 
mechanisms and privacy seals are means of reducing the effects of system uncertainties 
(Pavlou, 2003). Transaction-specific uncertainties are caused by decisions of parties 
exchanging information over the transaction media (Weiber and Adler, 1995b). The 
consumer may interpret the uncertainties as seller’s potential behavior in the transaction 
process. In computer mediated transactions, element of personal interaction like body 
language, gestures, and facial expressions are eliminated (Winand and Pohl, 2000). 
In general, the more trust present in a given situation, the less additional 
information is needed to make a certain decision. On the other hand, if there is little or no 
trust, there will be a need for complete information in order to reduce system-dependent 
and transaction-specific uncertainties. Uncertainties are perceived differently and, hence, 
the level of the perceived uncertainties influences the needed balance between trust and 
information (Tomkins, 2001). Trust and additional information could be seen as means to 




5.2.9 Trust in Computer Science and Information Systems 
Computer scientists tried to formalize the measures of knowledge derived from sociology 
and psychology into agents’ architectures. One can understand trust as an attitude of an 
agent who believes that another agent has a given property. Therefore, one can analyze 
the meaning of trust as a function of the attributed properties. For instance, the property 
may be that the agent one trusts fulfills his obligations, like the case of a buying agent. 
Properties one considers are the ability of the agent to do the job, to make decisions, or 
just to deliver information (Demolombe, 2001; Gefen, 2003; Gefen et al., 2003). 
With the emergence of electronic commerce, trust issues became important for 
many people. Generally speaking, it is agreed that in order for electronic commerce to 
become successful, most people have to trust it. The person's trust in a transaction is 
determined by the trust in the counter party and the trust in the transaction media based 
on the assumption that party and media trust supplement each other. If there is not 
sufficient party trust, then the media trust and its control protocols should be brought in to 
supplement the party trust. Trust in the counter party can be defined as "The subjective 
probability by which an individual A expects that another individual B performs a given 
action on which its welfare depends" (Falcone and Castelfranci, 2001, p. 56). According 
to this definition, it could be argued that trust has both objective and subjective attributes. 
The first depends on the media structure, such as the functionality of the control 
mechanisms in place. The second depends on personal experiences in dealing with a 




5.2.10 Trust as a Global View 
Gambetta (2000) attempted to gather different thoughts regarding trust from many areas. 
The most important aspect of his work is the use of values. On the other hand, using 
explicit values for trust can be problematic due to the subjectivity of trust in which the 
same value could be seen differently by different agents. Yet the use of values for 
measuring trust allows one to talk more precisely about certain circumstances or 
behaviors concerning trust. Also, it permits a straightforward implementation of the 
formulation.  
In his research, Gambetta (2000, p. 217) defines trust as “a particular level of 
subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents 
will perform a particular action both before he can monitor such action or independently 
of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it and in a context in which it affects his own 
action”. This definition excludes certain aspects which are important to trust like 
referring only to the trust relationship between the agents themselves and not, for 
example, the agents and the environment. It also excludes those agents whose actions 
have no effect on the decision of the truster, despite the fact that trust is present. An 
interesting point in Gambetta’s work is the concern regarding competition and 
cooperation. In some cases, cooperation is not good, such as the cooperation among 
thieves or drug dealers, while it is very desirable among policemen. Then, it is beneficial 
to find “the optimal mixture of cooperation and competition rather than deciding at which 
extreme to converge” (Gambetta 2000, p. 215). In competitive situations, cooperation is 
of great importance since “even to compete in a mutually non-destructive way one needs 
at some level to trust one’s competitors to comply with certain rules” (Gambetta 2000, p. 
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215). Despite the importance of using values for trust, Gambetta didn’t develop the idea 
in any concrete fashion (Marsh 1994). 
 
5.3 Approaches to Modeling Trust 
Different approaches have been used in an attempt to model trust, of which some have 
commercial applications and others are only meant for academic purposes. Some of these 
modeling attempts are only informative while others are conceptual. In the following 
sections, different approaches for modeling trust are classified based on their underlying 
methodologies. 
5.3.1 Simple Scoring 
Considered a relatively simple approach, some basic mathematical operators like, 
multiplication and addition, are used to compute trust values. The average and the 
weighted average are the two most common methods in this category. Getting direct 
ranking or feedback from the users and then averaging all the responses is a simple and 
intuitive way of the many techniques used in e-commerce (Amazon, 2002). A slightly 
modified version of this technique is being used in e-Bay (e-Bay, 2002). Both positive 
and negative scores are summed separately and then subtracting the total negatives from 
the total positives to get the overall score. The values often used are 1, 0, and -1 for the 
positive, neutral, and negative ratings, respectively.  In some cases, the weighted average 
is being implemented to put more emphases on the most recent transactions or to 
highlight some factors more than others. 
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5.3.2 Statistical 
When using this technique, a history of all previous interactions is maintained. This 
history is combined with the new interactions to compute the overall trust value using 
statistical approaches. The most common approach is Bayesian. The Bayesian system 
takes a binary input and utilizes the beta-Probability Density Function (PDF) to compute 
the updating. Within the PDF distribution, the two parameters ( ,α β ) refer to the positive 
and negative ratings, respectively.  
 The Bayesian system starts with 1 assigned to both parameters and keeps updating 
after each interaction. While this provides a sound theoretical basis for computing a trust 
value, it might not be easily understood by average users (Josang, 1999; Mui and 
Mohtashemi, 2001; Josang and Ismail, 2002; Mui et al., 2002). 
5.3.3  Linguistic 
Sometimes, it is easier describing the level of trust using some linguistic terms rather than 
numerical values. Using fuzzy or probabilistic approaches, those linguistic terms could be 
matched with appropriate or approximated numerical values that are easy to calculate and 
program. Al-Mutairi et al. (2005b) used the linguistic terms absolutely low, very low,  
low, fairly low, medium, fairly high, high, very high, and absolutely high to describe the 
trust level. This enables the agent to calculate the trustworthiness of another agent before 
engaging with it in an interaction. Fuzzy logic is used to match those linguistic terms with 
approximated values to carry on some computations and obtain the overall expected trust 
value. This also depends on some other factors like the importance of the interaction for a 
specific agent, the expected value, the availability of other alternatives, and the risk 
attitudes of the agent. 
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5.3.4 Cognitive 
 This technique tries to mimic the human way of thinking and reasoning about trust. It 
attempts to go beyond sensible things and explore what transpires in the mind of one 
when trusting. This is highly linked to one’s belief and social community. For an inner 
feeling or confidence one may or may not trust another person. The thresholds of what is 
trustworthy or not will be different for different agents. Some authors (Josang, 2001) use 
the belief theory to predict a trust value. Belief theory is a framework based on 
probability theory where the total of the probabilities doesn’t necessarily add up to 1. 
This is in part due to the presence of some uncertainties. It is important to mention that 
transitivity is an underlying assumption in most of the models in this category where an 
agent is considered as trustworthy if referred to as trustworthy by other agent or agents. 
5.3.5 Fuzzy 
When using fuzzy logic to evaluate trust, it is possible to refer to trust using a linguistic 
label that describes a specific fuzzy function rather than using numerical values. The trust 
level can have different memberships to different fuzzy sets like belonging to trustworthy 
and very trustworthy with memberships of 0.4 and 0.6, respectively. The models 
proposed by Al-Mutairi et al. (2005b), Manchala (1998), and Sabater and Sierra (2001, 
2002) are good examples of this type of modeling.  
5.3.6 Flow Chains 
The main assumption underlying this category of models is transitivity. By that, one 
means that if agent a trusts agent b, agent b trusts agent c, then agent a must trust agent c. 
It could be as simple as an interaction between three agents or through long chains and 
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loops of iterative deals. However, it could be the case that trust values from different 
agents are assigned different weights depending on the previous history of that particular 
agent. More interaction chains through a particular agent means higher trust value and 
vice versa. In web semantics, the more hyperlinks to a site the higher its rank and more 
hyperlinks out of that page the less its rank (Page et al., 1998). 
 
5.4 Discussion 
Table 5.1 shows a chronological summary of some of the existing work in trust modeling. 
From this extensive review, one can highlight the following issues for further 
investigation when modeling trust. 
5.4.1 Unrated Transactions 
Though sighted as one of the most common ways of evaluating the rules of trust, 
feedback is not always given for all transactions (Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002). This is 
in part due to the following: 
- Lack of incentive (no direct benefits of providing feedback). 
- Retaliation from the seller or service provider in response to negative feedback. 
- Competition for a limited service or commodity. 
-  Feedback mechanism is lengthy or not easy to use. 
- Ignorance. 
Thinking of feedback as only being important in case it is negative (a way of warning 
others) while neglecting the positive ones could give a misleading trust value. For 
example, on e-Bay, assume that only 50 out 1000 transactions are assigned a negative 
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feedback (the remaining 950 are positive). The score will be 950 when all transactions 
are given a feedback while the score for the same seller will be 750 if only 800 out of the 
950 positive transactions are reported. This will cause the positive feedback ranking for 




Table 5.1: Chronological summary of some of the existing trust models. 
Year Author(s) Domain Methodology Remarks 
1994 S. Marsh Computer Science Simple Scoring Simple mathematical formulation for 
multiagent systems. 
1998 C. Castelfranchi and R. 
Falcone 
Multiagent Systems Cognitive Based on goals, mental states, and beliefs. 
1998 D. Manchala Electronic Commerce Fuzzy Focuses on the relationship between trust 
and risk 
1998 L. Page et al. Electronic Commerce Flow Chains Transitivity through loops or long chains 
of interactions 
1999 G. Zacharia Electronic Commerce Simple Scoring Sporas and Histos are two modified 
models for online reputation systems with 
a focus on recent ratings. 
1999 A. Josang Electronic Commerce Statistical Based on statistically updating Beta 
probability density functions  
2000 M. Schillo et al. Multiagent Systems Statistical Boolean logic where it is either strictly 
good or bad. 
2000 A. Abdul-Rahman and 
S. Hailes 
Multiagent Systems Linguistic Based on witness information with some 
adjustments 
2000 J. Schneider et al. Electronic Commerce Simple Scoring Averaging all ratings (both positive and 
negative) 
2001 B. Esfandiary and S. 
Chandrasekharan 
Multiagent Systems Statistical Trust acquisition using Bayesian learning 
2001 L. Mui and M. 
Mohtashemi 
Electronic Commerce Statistical Based on statistically updating Beta 
probability density functions 
2001 A. Josang Electronic Commerce Cognitive Based on belief theory where the 
probabilities don’t necessarily add up to 1. 
2001,2002 B. Yu and M. Singh Multiagent Systems Statistical Only most recent information is 
considered for calculation 






Table 5.1: (continued) 
2002 S. Sen and N. Sajja Multiagent Systems Statistical Both direct interactions and observed ones 
are considered. 
2002 eBay, Amazon, OnSale Electronic Commerce Simple Scoring Online reputation models through direct 
feedback. 
2002 J. Carbo et al. Multiagent Systems Fuzzy Uses weighted aggregation to combine old 
and new reputation values. 
2002 J. Carter et al. Multiagent Systems Cognitive Uses weighted aggregation but the values 
used are different for different societies.  
2002 A. Josang and R. Ismail Electronic Commerce Statistical Based on statistically updating Beta 
probability density functions 
2002 L. Mui et al. Electronic Commerce Statistical Based on statistically updating Beta 
probability density functions 
2003 V. Cahill et al. Electronic Commerce Linguistic Some heuristics are needed to associate 
linguistic labels to values 
2003 M. Carbone et al. Electronic Commerce Linguistic Some heuristics are needed to associate 
linguistic labels to values 
2003 S. Kamvar Electronic Commerce Flow Chains Transitivity through loops or long chains 
of interactions 
2004 A. Withby Electronic Commerce Statistical Based on statistically updating Beta 
probability density functions 
2004 C. Zeigler Electronic Commerce Flow Chains Transitivity through loops or long chains 
of interactions 
2004 R. Levien  Electronic Commerce Flow Chains Transitivity through loops or long chains 
of interactions 
2005 E. Maximilien and M. 
Singh 
Multiagent Systems Statistical Aggregate different scores for multiple 
attributes and choose the agent with the 
highest score  
2006 N. Griffiths et al. Peer-to-Peer Systems Fuzzy Combine a set of rules to represent and 




5.4.2 Misleading Feedback 
Feedback could be misleading when, for some reason, it is unfair or not justified whether 
they are positive or negative. Some of the sited reasons for having a false positive 
feedback are: 
- Reciprocation: a positive feedback for a positive feedback in return. 
- Being rewarded with a discounted price. 
- Building a good reputation through prearranged fake interactions. 
In contrast, false negative feedback could be due to: 
- Based on a specific identity of a specific agent whether it is because of a previous 
interaction history or personal reasons. 
- Blaming the seller or the service provider for a shortcoming on behalf of the 
buyer or the service recipient. 
-  Reasons that are beyond the control of the seller which could be related to the 
transaction media or the delivery system. 
The process of providing feedback is a very subjective issue that is hard to monitor and 
control (Miller et al., 2002).   
5.4.3 Identity Verification 
One of the risks associated with electronic environments is verifying that an agent is what 
he or she is claiming to be (Zacharia et al., 1999). Some of the identity associated risks 
are: 
- Stolen verification information (username and passwords). 
- Identity change to escape from a past transaction history. 
- Validating the information supplied during the registration process. 
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Based on the assumption that trust is the result of acquired cumulative reputation over a 
period of time through a number of interactions, not being able to verify the agents’ 
identities will give a misleading trust index (Pavlou, 2003).  
5.4.4 Behavioral Changes 
When showing good intentions, regardless of the current low trust index, agents need to 
be given a chance to recover and start a corrective process (Jøsang and Ismail, 2002). An 
agent might start with a low trust index for one or more of the following reasons: 
- Focusing on the short term benefits and not worrying about a long lasting one. 
- Lack of knowledge about the importance of building a good reputation on the 
virtual environments. 
- Reasons that are related to the transaction media which is beyond the control of 
the agent. 
- Change of the service provider’ management in order to recover from the current 
situation. 
- Change of the service type or product. 
- Behavioral changes over time. 
Giving more weight on the most recent transactions, like for the past six months or last 
year without entirely neglecting the past interactions (Buchegger et al., 2003a,b), will 
give a more reflective index of the agent’s current situation. This will also allow one to 






From this extensive review, one can appreciate the importance of trust across many 
disciplines. However, trust research is still in its early stages and varies greatly depending 
on the trust context and use. Most of the models are based on feedback through direct 
interactions or conveyed through a third party. Though agreeing on the importance of 
direct experiences, there are more factors that contribute to trust that should be taken into 
consideration. By its nature, trust is complex, multidimensional, and subjective. It might 
be time to merge traditional game theoretic approaches with cognitive, sociologists, and 
psychological ones in order to better understand and model trust. Due to the variation in 
defining and using trust, as of now, there is no single set of unified trust data that could 
be tested and compared among the different trust models. Testing and comparing trust 
models are still an arbitrary issue. Developing test data sets and general test frameworks 
will enable fine tuning and improving some of the proposed models. It will also enable 
researchers to examine which model works better for which uses. Chapter 6 presents the 














Modeling Trust using a Fuzzy Logic 
Approach 
In open and unpredictable environments, one might have incomplete, misleading, vague, 
imprecise, or ambiguous information. Since fuzzy logic has been demonstrated to work 
well in such environments, fuzzy logic will used to model trust.  This will be of great 
importance in the areas of decision making, e-commerce, and multiagent systems in order 
to capture some of the complexity and dynamics of trust. The proposed model doesn’t 
question the validity of the other existing models but rather tries to bring them all 
together in one robust model that capture all the important elements of trust.  
 
6.1 Overview 
In order to build a long term relationship to achieve some goals and benefits that are not 
achievable on individual basis, one needs to trust others and cooperate with them. This 
might require scarifying some short term benefits. To minimize the chances of loss and 
betrayal, one needs to make a trusting decision. Currently, trust is being modelled as a 
variable with a threshold for action. When the value of the trust variable exceeds the 
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specified threshold, a binary decision is taken. This action in most of the cases is 
“cooperate” or “don’t cooperate” and “trust” or “don’t trust”. Trust is only required in 
situations of risk and uncertainty. The trustor needs to decide between two alternatives; to 
“trust” or “not to trust”. In a situation that requires trust, the potential loss is higher than 
the potential gain; otherwise the decision would not be one between trusting and not 
trusting but based on a rational “loss-benefit” analysis. The general framework for the 
proposed trust model is displayed in Figure 6.1. It consists of three main modules: the 
decision maker, the trustworthy assessment, and the fuzzy evaluation. 
 
6.2 Decision Maker 
Besides having positive feelings, to be able to make a trusting decision, we need to 
consider some objective factors from within the surrounding environment. A decision 
maker tries to collect as much information as possible about the person or agent of 
concern. This could come from a third party, past history (reputation), or by observation. 
A set of required or predefined factors to be known prior to making a trust decision 
include (but not limited to) information, actions and statements, exception clauses, 
circumstances, and judgment. 
 
6.2.1  Information 
A key factor in the trusting decision is how much knowledge one has about the trustee. 
The more information one has the better one understands the situation and estimates the 
possible gains and losses. Information could be acquired through: 
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1. Direct or personal knowledge of the potential trustee. 
2. Indirect knowledge (through a third party). 
3. Past experiences (reputation) whether it is direct or indirect. 
 
 
















4. Social Role (the position or the job of someone might give an indication of how 
much trust one can put on him or her). 
Information from the above sources can be collected, interpreted, and evaluated to 
construct a characterization or picture of the persons or agents of concern but in reality 
they are free agents with different characterizations that go beyond one’s beliefs about 
them. 
6.2.2 Risk 
When introducing the concept of trust one is already referring to risk whether it is in a 
direct or indirect way. Risk is activated by our actions, the choices we make, and the 
decisions we take (see Figure 6.2). When trusting, one is actually taking risks (accepting  
 




When trusting, we are 
taking some risks 
Risks are activated by 
decisions we take
Risks are activated by 
choices we make 
Risk is an integral 
component of trust 





the risks and trying to handle them). In other words, one tries to know what is going to 
happen in the future and ignoring the fact that risk is still there. To keep relationships 
going, it is necessary to take some risks. Depending on how one handles them, they might 
strengthen the existing trust or reduce it dramatically. Even if the trust decision is made 
based on evidence, there is always a chance of risk (Cvetkovivh and Lofstedt, 1999). 
Despite its usefulness in both human and artificial societies, trust was and will still be a 
risky proposition. Since the early years of studies about trust, risk has been considered 
one of the closest elements to the trust concept and one of the most important factors that 
affect trust decisions. It becomes even more typical and understandable that decisions 
cannot avoid risk (Zeckauser and Viscusi, 1990). 
Based on the fact that risks have been always an integral component of decisions 
and actions, it could be claimed that they do not exist by themselves. If you refrain from 
action, you will not have any risk. Trust is based on a relationship between risk and 
action. Action defines itself in relation to a particular risk as a future possibility.  Whether 
or not one places trust in future events, the perception and evaluation of risk is a highly 
subjective matter. The same situation will be perceived differently by different people 
depending on their personal attitudes and whether they are risk-seekers or risk-averse. 
It could be argued that the decision whether to trust or not is a function of the 
expected gain and loss involved. The decision to place trust is similar to the decision to 
place a bet. A rational decision maker will place trust if the chance of winning, relative to 
the chance of losing, is greater than the amount that would be lost relative to the amount 
that would be won (see Figure 6.3). The sensible thing to do for the potential trustor is to 
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collect as much additional information as possible on the potential gain and loss involved 
and the trustworthiness of the trustee. Information will have the effect of changing one's 
estimate of the probability of gain and the trust decision when compared to the predefined 
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Trust is closely related and tied up with uncertainty. In general, uncertainty is the absence 
of credible knowledge about future events. Trust is supposed to assure an agent that the 
desirable course of events will be realized in the unknowable future as if being 
guaranteed from the past knowledge. As Luhmann (1979, p. 32) wrote, “trust rests on 
illusion. In actuality, there is less information available than would be required to give 
assurance of success. The actor willingly surmounts this deficit of information”.  
In favor of an inner confidence, a person in this illusory state of trust simplifies 
the complexity of the outer world and removes any external uncertainty. As a result of 
lack of information and a deceptive sense, the trustful individual finds a possibility of 
comprehending new experiences and carrying out actions that have been previously 
undesirable or unachievable. 
The existing objective events and states of the outer world help to form an agent’s 
subjective assumptions, even if it is partial or unreliable, about whether or not to trust. 
Yet, the objective available evidence under consideration serves only as hints at the 
possibility of trust rather than ensuring its certainty. It is true that the state of partial 
knowledge (incomplete or unreliable) is the only feasible environment for emerging trust. 
In the extreme case of total knowledge or total ignorance, trust becomes an empty 
concept. With complete certainty, there will be no need or even possibility for trust to 
develop. On the other hand, in the case of absolute ignorance, there can be no reason to 






When trusting, one allows him or herself to be vulnerable to others by depending on them 
to achieve or care for something one values. The interdependence relationship occurs 
when it is in the mutual benefit for both parties to fulfill their obligations towards the 
achievement of their common goal. In this case, no party is having a dominant power 
over the other. While engaging in a dependence relationship, none of the parties is willing 
to exploit its situation.  The realization of this dependency relation by the trustee will put 
him or her in a relatively more powerful situation (Luhmann, 1979). If properly used, this 
kind of power will strengthen the trust relationship. Some trustee might refrain from 
using this power to avoid the negative consequences associated with exploiting the 
dependent trustor. 
6.2.5 Reputation 
Reputation is looking back at the history of the person and his or her past experiences and 
trying to predict how he or she would act in the future (Sztompka, 1999). It is more of a 
system with some feedback since after each interaction, it would improve (positive) or 
decrease his or her reputation (negative) based on his or her behavior in that specific 
interaction (see Figure 6.4). 
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Figure 6.4: Trust and reputation. 
 
 
Decisions about whether or not one should trust another person depend on that 
person's reputation, and a favorable reputation is something which everyone would like to 
establish (Zacharia and Maes, 2000). Therefore, the ways in which a good reputation is 
established or destroyed are important. Not only will the perceivers of a reputation 
usually have access to information which the reputation holder does not control, but also 
the manner in which the information are interpreted is not straightforward. Such 
information will often be ambiguous and open to many readings, and, even when it is not, 
it is not necessarily the case that all people will assign any particular item the same 
significance. The interpretation of a reputation will be a function of the interpreter and, 
therefore, it is necessary to consider how new information is handled and is related to 









One usually wishes to know the sort of person one is dealing with before one 
deals with him or her. But one will know it only imperfectly. One forms an opinion on 
the basis of his or her background, the opportunities he or she has faced, the courses of 
action he or she has taken, and so forth (Sztompka, 1999). Our opinion is thus based 
partly on the theory one holds of the effect of culture, social class membership, and on a 
person's motivation and hence his or her behavior. The opinion which is publicly formed 
and held is this person's reputation. The problem, in essence, is to infer the person's 
qualities from such data. 
For trust to be developed between individuals they must have repeated 
encounters, and they must have some memory of previous encounters. And finally, trust 
is linked with reputation, and reputation has to be acquired. Reputation is like a capital 
asset. One can build it up by pursuing certain courses of action, or destroy it by pursuing 
certain others. A reputation for honesty, or trustworthiness, is usually acquired gradually. 
Although a reputation for honesty may be acquired slowly, it can generally be destroyed 
very quickly (Hardin, 2002). 
6.2.6  Actions and Statements 
In the absence of credible information, one tries to construct a characterization or picture 
of someone based on his or her actions or statements. While truth telling, sincerity, 
promise keeping, keeping confidences, reliability, keeping appointments, and concern for 
others are signs for positive moral values and attitudes, lying, dishonesty, unreliability, 
and not keeping promises, on the other hand, are signs that we shouldn’t invest much in 
this person. An overall sense of someone is derived from specific actions and statements 
that are projected to circumstances in future of some interest to the trustor. One should 
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always keep in mind that these statements and actions might be specific to a certain 
person in a certain situation in a certain time.   
6.2.7  Exception Clauses  
Realising the fact that things might mean something different from what it appears to, it 
is wise not to generalize judgments without knowing the motives and circumstances. The 
use of exception clause is very important when interpreting someone else’s actions. 
Someone’s behavior might not reflect really what it appears to mean. For example, when 
I lock myself out and try to get in, for someone just passing by, I am just a thief but in 
reality I am just trying to get in my house. My action in this case seems untrustworthy but 
the reality is not what it looks to be. 
6.2.8  Circumstances 
Different circumstances require different degrees of trust or distrust. For example, to trust 
someone to help us carry some packages across the street is not a big issue assuming that 
the packages don’t contain valuable items because the worst thing that could happen is 
that the person would run away with the packages. On the other hand, we should think 
twice before accepting assistance from someone we don’t know well before accepting his 
or her help to transfer some valuable items. Finally, deciding to trust or distrust someone 
is like belief. One can’t believe and disbelieve in something at the same time. To accept 





6.2.9  Judgment 
 Based on how much information one knows about another one, how reliable the 
information, how to interpret his or her statements and actions, is there a chance that one 
misunderstood or misinterpreted his or her statements and actions, and what are the 
circumstances that surrounded those actions, one could make an overall judgment 
whether that person deserves to be trusted or not. Of course, when deciding to go for the 
extremes (totally trusting or totally distrusting) someone, one needs to look for solid 
evidence, whether they are positive or negative. There is little or no room for an 
exception or unless clauses in this case. In cases of little or limited trust or distrust, one 
may consider the exception clauses and consider some questionable information. 
 
6.3 Trustworthy Assessment 
A logical and distinct step separating trusting from gambling is the assessment of the 
trustworthiness of the agent or person of concern. The decision maker collects 
information, evaluates, and interprets them   to make an estimate of the qualities of the 
agent of concern. By comparing those qualities with a predefined scale for the minimum 













6.3.1 Trust Criteria 
Based on a comprehensive and thorough study of trust among different disciplines as 
described in chapter 5, the three main criteria for trust are the available information about 
the agent of concern, the circumstances for that issue in regard to that specific agent, and 
the judgment of the agent in charge of making the trust decision. Each of those criteria 
are classified further and split into sub-criteria as shown in Figure 6.5. 
Figure 6.5: Trustworthy criteria and sub-criteria. 
 
6.3.2 Fuzzy Values and Weights 
The issue of trust is very subjective. Even trying to express it in natural language is not an 
easy task. The same value might be interpreted differently by different agents. Compared 
to crisp values, the use of natural linguistic terms is easier to understand and interpret and 
at the same time can handle some uncertainties. Fuzzy logic approach tries to mimic how 
humans would make their decisions. It starts with natural language concepts like, this 




















over an interval rather than a crisp value. It is good for modeling subjective issues like 
trust that is difficult to estimate experimentally. Another advantage is that it works well 
with vague, ambiguous, imprecise, noisy, or missing input information.  
Due to the subjective nature of the evaluation criteria as well as the vague and 
imprecise nature of the available information, it is easier to express the values and the 
weights in natural linguistic terms rather than specifying crisp values. These linguistic 
terms could be assessed through the use of fuzzy logic. A six and five level scale weights 
and values and their corresponding fuzzy representations given in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, 
respectively. 
 
Table 6.1: Weights and their fuzzy representation. 
Linguistic Terms Generalized Fuzzy Numbers 
Totally Unimportant (0, 0, 0.1, 0.1; 1.0) 
Unimportant (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4; 1.0) 
Fairly Unimportant (0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6; 1.0) 
Fairly Important (0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8; 1.0) 
Important (0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0; 1.0) 
Very Important (0.9, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0; 1.0) 
 
 
Table 6.2: Values and their fuzzy representation. 
Linguistic Terms Generalized Fuzzy Numbers 
Low (0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3; 1.0) 
Fairly low (0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5; 1.0) 
Medium (0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7; 1.0) 
Fairly high (0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9; 1.0) 






As mentioned earlier, trust is subjective and multidimensional to the extent that it is 
difficult to design global thresholds that fit every situation. Such issue is relative to the 
agent in regard to a specific situation in specific time with specific attributes.  
6.3.4 Linguistic Scaling 
All criteria and thresholds are to be expressed using natural linguistic terms due to 
subjectivity and difficulty estimating them experimentally or in real life situations. It is 
up to the decision maker to decide on the importance and value of each factor. 
Converting these linguistic terms into numerical values is better accomplished through 
the use of fuzzy logic. Many popular linguistic terms and fuzzy values conversion scales 
have been proposed (Chen and Hwang, 1992; Karwowski and Mital, 1986; Miller, 1965). 
To get better and more accurate descriptive values and at the same reduce the 
unnecessary overlapping, it is recommended that the scales be between three and nine 
(Lin and Chen, 2004). 
  
6.4 Trust Computation 
After gathering all the necessary information and deciding on the trust criteria thresholds, 
a fuzzy computation is to be carried out to get the Fuzzy Weighted Average (FWA). Prior 
to that, a quick review of some of the fuzzy arithmetic will be covered in the following 
section. 
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6.4.1 Fuzzy Numbers and Their Arithmetic Operations 
As stated by Chen and Chen (2003), a generalized trapezoidal fuzzy number is 
represented as ( , , , ; ),A a b c d w= where 0 1,w≤ ≤ and , , ,  and a b c d are real numbers. If 
1,w = then the generalized fuzzy number A is called a normal trapezoidal fuzzy number 
denoted ( , , , ).A a b c d=  If  a b=  and ,c d=  then A is called a crisp interval. If ,b c=  
then A is called a generalized triangular fuzzy number. If a b c d= = =  and 1,w =  then 
A is called a real number.   
 Figure 6.6 shows a representation for a generalized trapezoidal fuzzy set 
1( , , , ; )A a b c d w=  which denote a fuzzy set describing a certain situation. The value of 














Figure 6.6: A generalized trapezoidal fuzzy number. 
 
 
The arithmetic operations between the generalized trapezoidal fuzzy numbers 1A  and 
2A  as follows: 
1. Fuzzy numbers addition: 
1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2( , , , ; ) ( , , , ; )A A a b c d w a b c d w⊕ = ⊕  
A 
X 







1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2( , , , ;min( , ))a a b b c c d d w w= + + + +      6.1 
           Where 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2, , , , , , ,  and a b c d a b c d  are any real numbers. 
2. Fuzzy numbers subtraction:  
1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2    ( , , , ; )     ( , , , ; )A A a b c d w a b c d w=  
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2( , , , ;min( , ))a d b c c b d a w w= − − − −      6.2 
      Where 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2, , , , , , ,  and a b c d a b c d are any real numbers. 
3. Fuzzy numbers multiplication: 
1 2 1 2( , , , ;min( , ))A A a b c d w w⊗ =       6.3 
 Where 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2min( , , , ),a a a a d d a d d= × × × ×  
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2min( , , , ),b b b b c c b c c= × × × ×   
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2max( , , , ),c b b b c c b c c= × × × ×   
and 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2max( , , , ).d a a a d d a d d= × × × ×  
 it is obvious that if 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2, , , , , , ,  and a b c d a b c d are all positive real numbers, then 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2( , , , ;min( , )).A A a a b b c c d d w w⊗ = × × × ×  
4. Fuzzy numbers division: 
The inverse of the fuzzy number 1A is 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1( , , , ; )w
A d c b a
=  where 
1 1 1 1, , ,  and a b c d are all nonzero positive real numbers or all nonzero negative real 
numbers. If 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2, , , , , , ,  and a b c d a b c d  are all nonzero positive real numbers, 
then the division of 1A  and 2A  is 
1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2( , , , ; ) ( , , , ; )A A a b c d w a b c d w∅ = ∅  
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1 1 1 1
1 2
2 2 2 2
( , , , ;min( , ))a b c d w w
d c b a
=       6.4 
6.4.2 Fuzzy Weighted Average (FWA) 
To consolidate the fuzzy values and fuzzy weights of all the important trust factors into a 
Fuzzy Weighted Average (FWA), (Schmucker, 1984) which will be used as an indication 
of the attractiveness of the situation. The higher the FWA value, the more trustworthy the 
agent is. Let jR and ,jW  where 1,2,..., ,j n=  respectively be the fuzzy rating and fuzzy 






FWA W R W
= =
= ⊗∑ ∑                                  6.5                 
6.4.3 Simple Center of Gravity Matching Method 
Once the FWA has been computed, this value could be approximated by a similar close 
linguistic term from the Trust Value (TV, see Table 6.2). Several methods for matching 
the FWA with the corresponding TV have been proposed (Kosko, 1986; Rutter, 2000). 
The method of Simple Center of Gravity Method (SCGM) is based on the concept of 
medium curve. If A is a generalized trapezoidal fuzzy number, where ( , , , ; ),A a b c d w=  
then the value *y  of the COG point of A is 
*
( 2)
,       0 1
6
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))(()( *** −+++=                                                                                    6.7 
The COG point of a generalized trapezoidal fuzzy number A is 
).,()( ** AA yxACOG =                                                                                                       6.8 
6.4.4 Similarity Measure between Generalized Fuzzy Numbers 
Assuming that there are two generalized trapezoidal fuzzy numbers 1A and 2A  where 
1 1 1 1 1 1( , , , ; ),A a b c d w=  2 2 2 2 2 2( , , , ; ),A a b c d w=  1 1 1 10 1,a b c d≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤  and 
2 2 2 20 1.a b c d≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤  
First we obtain the COG points of 1A and 2A . Then, the degree of similarity 1 2( , )S A A  
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where 
1 2
  and  A AS S  are the lengths of the bases of the generalized trapezoidal fuzzy 
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6.5 The Stag Hunt 
In game theory, the stag hunt, also known as “trust dilemma," "assurance game," and 
"coordination game" represents a conflict between own safety and social cooperation. 
The name came from the work of the Swiss-born French philosopher Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau. In his work of 1755, a Discourse on Inequality, he described the situation 
where two men went hunting.  Independently, each can choose to hunt a stag or hunt a 
hare. Without knowing the choice of the other, each one must choose his action. The two 
must cooperate with each other to hunt down a stag. Individually, each can hunt a hare by 
his own. The worth of a whole hare is less than the share of a stag. This has been 
considered as an important representation for social cooperation.  
The odd thing about the stag hunt is that it shouldn't be a dilemma at all. One 
should certainly cooperate and hunt a stag. If both hunters do, both will get the best 
possible payoff. What complicate things is the possibility that one won't be so rational. If 
the one pursue a hare, the other wants to do too otherwise will end up with nothing.  
In his writings, Rousseau, idealized ancient men and held civilization responsible 
for the majority of social problems. His philosophy in most is based on a rough and 
partially inaccurate conceptualization of prehistory. Part Two of a Discourse on 
Inequality states that the ancient human societies began when people forged temporary 
alliances for hunting.   
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If the issue is only about hunting a stag, then it is easy to realize that everyone 
should carry out his obligations. The issue arises when a hare happened to be within the 
reach of one of the hunters. The dilemma is now would he have gone off in pursuit of it, 
and therefore having caught his own prey, he wouldn’t care much about having caused 
his companion to lose his.  
Among the most recent stag hunt dilemmas is the 1989 constitutional amendment 
to prohibit the burning of the U.S. flag and make it a federal crime. The main reason for 
objecting to this bill is that it violates of freedom of expression. On the other hand, the 
opposing party feared that if they voted against it and it passed, it would be used against 
them. Their opponents would show them "in favor of flag burning" and hence being 
unpatriotic in the next elections. According to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., an opponent 
of the bill, "More than 45 senators would vote 'no' if they knew they were casting the 
deciding vote." Since the year 1995, the flag burning amendment has always gained 
enough votes to pass in the House of Representatives but not in the Senate. Fell four 
votes short of the required two-third majority, in 2000, the Senate voted 63–37 in favor of 
the amendment. Another attempt in 2006 fell one vote short.  
The stag hunt could used to describe the ethical dilemma of the scientists who 
built the atomic bomb. In 1950, Harold Urey said of the hydrogen bomb: the world would 
be better off without the bomb. "I personally hope very much that the bombs will not 
explode, no matter how much effort is put into the project". Having no assurances that 
our enemies will not build it, we have to try to build it. It is better that we have the bomb 
rather than our enemies; better both sides have the bomb than just our enemies.  
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When recalling the head injury of professional hockey player Teddy Green in 
1969, Newsweek stated: “Players will not adopt helmets by individual choice for several 
reasons. Chicago star Bobby Hull cites the simplest factor: "Vanity." But many players 
honestly believe that helmets will cut their efficiency and put them at a disadvantage, and 
others fear the ridicule of opponents. The use of helmets will spread only through fear 
caused by injuries like Green's – or through a rule making them mandatory.... One player 
summed up the feelings of many: "It's foolish not to wear a helmet. But I don't – because 
the other guys don't. I know that's silly, but most of the players feel the same way. If the 
league made us do it, though, we'd all wear them and nobody would mind."1 
6.5.1 Formal Definition 
In game theory terminology, the stag hunt is a game with two pure strategy Nash 
equilibria of which one is risk dominant and the other is payoff dominant. A payoff 
dominant equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that pays at least as well as any other 
equilibrium for all players and for at least one player, it is strictly more. This is also 
referred to as pareto superior. This refinement of Nash equilibrium was introduced by 
Harsanyi and Selten in 1988 (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988). A risk dominant equilibrium is 
a player’s best response to a strategy profile of the other players or a probability 
distribution over these profiles. If each player assigns a uniform probability over the 
other’s pure strategies and s* is the unique best response for both, then (s*, s*) is the risk 
dominant equilibrium (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988).  
                                                 
1 Newsweek, October 6, 1969. 
 119 
 
 Table 6.3 shows the game in its generic form. In this table, while DM 1, or hunter 
1, controls the row strategies, DM 2, or hunter 2, controls the column strategies. When 
each hunter selects a strategy, a state is formed, which is represented by a cell in the 
matrix. The double letters given at the top of each cell represent the strategies selection 
by each of the two DMs where the letters on the left and right stand for the strategies of 
DMs 1 and 2, respectively. For example, the cell given as SS which will be referred to by 
the encircled number 1, for simplicity sake, is the state in which both DM 1 and DM 2 
pursue a stag. The two letters given in brackets in the bottom of a cell represent the 
preferences of DM 1 (left entry, uppercase letters) and DM 2 (right entry, lowercase 
letters), where a higher number means more preferred. Here it is assumed that 
a b d c> ≥ >  and .A B D C> ≥ >  For instance, A = a = 4, B = b = 3, C = c = 0, and D = 
d = 3 (see Table 6.4). Games with a similar structure but without the risk dominant Nash 
equilibrium are still called stag hunt by some game theoretic. For example if A = a = 2, B 
= b = 1, C = c = 0, and D = d = 1. While the state HH remains a Nash equilibrium, it is no 
anymore a risk dominant. Nevertheless, many would still call this game a stag hunt. 
Table 6.3: Generic form of the stag hunt. 
  DM 2 



























Table 6.4: Example of the stag hunt. 
  DM 2 





















 While the prisoner’s dilemma (refer to section 3.7 for more details) gained a lot of 
attention as the best game that represents the problem of social cooperation, some authors 
believe that the stag hunt represents an equally (or more) interesting context for studying 
social cooperation and its problems (Skyrms, 2003). 
 Due to the substantial relationship between the two games of prisoner’s dilemma 
and stag hunt, many situations that have been described as prisoner's dilemma might also 
be interpreted as a stag hunt. In a similar fashion, some human interactions that seem like 
prisoner's dilemmas may in fact be a stag hunt. Assume that we have the prisoner's 
dilemma shown in Table 6.5. Players who defect when others tend to cooperate are 
usually punished for their defection. Imposing a -2 payoff as a punishment will turn this 
game of prisoner’s dilemma into a stag hunt game. 
 
Table 6.5: Prisoner's Dilemma. 
  DM 2 



























6.5.2 Stag Hunt: Trust and Cooperation 
There is a strong relationship between trust and cooperative actions and how one’s 
attitudes and actions change when realizing the fact that one is being trusted or trusting 
someone else. Generally speaking, one could say that the presence of complete distrust 
will eliminate any chance for cooperation (Gambetta, 2000; Mares, 2001). 
 When trying to explain cooperative actions, it can’t be studied in isolation of other 
influential factors like trust, importance of the situation, risk involved, and sharing some 
common goals. The presence of trust will eliminate or decrease fears of betrayal when 
engaging in a cooperative situation. Other factors like low risks and the importance of the 
situation could complement and support low levels of trust. On the other hand, having a 
high level of risk and having low importance when combined with low level of trust will 
reduce the chances of cooperation. One uses some mental shortcuts like trust to reduce 
the situation’s complexity and the chances for risks thereafter (Luhmann, 1979). 
 As Rousseau (1955) stated: “If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well 
realized that he must remain faithfully at his post; but if a hare happened to pass within 
the reach of one of them, we cannot doubt that he would have gone off in pursuit of it 
without scruple and, having caught his own prey, he would have cared very little about 
having caused his companions to lose theirs.” Each needs assurances that he will not be 
betrayed by the other and ends up with nothing. To estimate the value of trust in this case, 
one uses the information in Tables 6.4 and 6.6. Table 6.6 shows the main criteria and sub-
criteria for trust in the stag hunt game along with their corresponding fuzzy values and 
weights. Originally, most of these values are expressed in natural linguistic terms like 
saying the risk for this situation is high. From Table 6.2, one can see that the matching 
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fuzzy interval for high is (0.8, 0.9, 1.0, 1.0; 1.0). Different decision makers would have 
different weights for the different factors.   Using the information in Table 6.6 and 
employing Equation 6.5, one obtains the fuzzy values for the main criteria shown in 
Figure 6.5 as follows: 
Information = (0.306, 0.522, 0.858, 1.308) 
Circumstances = (0.312, 0.543, 0.909, 1.435) 
Judgment = (0.236, 0.434, 0.765, 1.320) 
Computing the Fuzzy Weighted Average using Equation 6.5, one obtains: FWA = (0.285, 
0.555, 1.055, 1.935)  
 
Table 6.6: Main and sub-criteria of trust and their fuzzy values and weights. 
Criteria Sub-Criteria Fuzzy Values Fuzzy Weights 
Information   (0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0; 1.0) 
 Risk (0.8, 0.9, 1.0, 1.0; 1.0) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0; 1.0) 
 Uncertainty (0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9; 1.0) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0; 1.0) 
 Dependence (0.8, 0.9, 1.0, 1.0; 1.0) (0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8; 1.0) 
 Reputation (0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7; 1.0) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0; 1.0) 
Circumstances   (0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0; 1.0) 
 Importance (0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9; 1.0) (0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8; 1.0) 
 Value (0.8, 0.9, 1.0, 1.0; 1.0) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0; 1.0) 
 Alternatives (0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9; 1.0) (0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8; 1.0) 
 Deadlines   
Judgment   (0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0; 1.0) 
 Attractiveness (0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9; 1.0) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0; 1.0) 
 Actions & 
Statments 
  
 Feelings & 
Emotions 





 Using Equations 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, and 6.11, the COG and base points for the five-member 
fuzzy linguistic set in Table 6.2 are shown in Table 6.7. 
 
Table 6.7: COG and base points for fuzzy trust values. 
Linguistic term COG points Base 
Low (0.15,0.389) 0.30 
Fairly low (0.35,0.389) 0.30 
Medium (0.55,0.389) 0.30 
Fairly high (0.75,0.389) 0.30 
High (0.85,0.500) 0.20 
 
 In a similar fashion, the COG (FWA) = (0.993, 0.383) and the base S= 1.65. 
According to Equation 6.10, one can see that values of ),,( lowR SSB  ),,( lowfairlyR SSB −  
),,( mediumR SSB  ),,( highfairlyR SSB −  and ( , )R highB S S  are all equal to 1. Based on Equation 
6.9, the degree of similarity between the Fuzzy Weighted Average (FWA) and the five-
member linguistic terms are: 
),( lowRS = 0.030. 
),( lowfairlyRS − = 0.138. 
),( mediumRS  = 0.294. 
),( highfairlyRS − = 0.420. 
),( highRS  = 0.370. 
 Because ),( highfairlyRS −  has the highest value (0.420), Fuzzy Weighted Average 
(FWA) is translated into a fairly high value. In this case, we would say that the degree of 
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similarity is 0.420. In other words, the trust index (based on the available information) is 
fairly high. 
6.5.3 Stability Analysis 
Stag Hunt can be solved using different solution concepts like Nash stability, general 
metarationality (GMR), symmetric metarationality (SMR), and sequential stability (SEQ) 
(see Fang et al., 1997 for precise definitions of these solution concepts along with 
original references). The results obtained using these different solution concepts are 
provided in Table 6.8. In this table, a “U” stands for a state that is unstable for a 
particular player. In other words, a player could move unilaterally to another state that 
will produce a better payoff without a credible sanction being levied by the opponent 
player.  An “S” stands for a state that is stable for a particular player. It could be stable 
because there are no unilateral improvements by that particular player or for any 
unilateral improvement the opponent player can invoke a sanction according to the way a 
sanction is defined for a given solution concept. A state that is stable for both players 
constitutes an equilibrium state denoted by E.  
 According to Nash stability, the equilibrium point will be SS and HH. A Nash 
equilibrium is the situation where it is not advantageous for either player to move to 
another state unilaterally because it will produce a worse payoff or at least not better than 
the current one. Equilibrium SS represents the case were both hunters will cooperate and 
together pursue a stag. However, there is always a chance that one of them will go after a 
hare and securing his gain while letting his companion loss his. Whether it is mentioned 
explicitly or not, only the presence of some trust will eliminate this fear of betrayal. 
Howard (1971), derived the solution concepts of GMR and SMR which realistically 
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predict state both SS and HH as equilibria. It works as corrective action in case of defect 
from the other. It gives the player the chance to counteract the action of the opponent. 
The SEQ solution concept developed by Fraser and Hipel (1984) also forecasts SS, along 
with HH as equilibria. An attractive feature of SEQ stability is that only credible 
sanctioning is permitted by the sanctioning player. As an example of how to calculate 
SEQ stability, consider state HS from player 1’s viewpoint. As shown in Table 5.2, if the 
game where at state HS, player 1 can unilaterally improve from state HS to state SS by 
changing his strategy from hare to stag (notice that the ordinal payoff for player 1 is 3 in 
state HS versus 4 at state SS). However, player 2 has no unilateral improvement from 
state SS. Since there is no credible sanction for this move by player 2 and hence the new 
state SS is more preferred by both players, state HS is not SEQ stable for player 1. Since 
both SS and HH have no UIs for both players, they both constitute SEQ equilibria.  
 If one considers that in some real life situations a move may be irreversible and 
can’t be taken back once it is invoked, a state may no longer be stable according to a 
particular solution concept. In fact, the graph model for conflict resolution can directly 
account for irreversible moves (Fang et al., 1993). For example, once a hunter pursued a 
hare, he missed the chance to help his companion hunt down a stag. Since each has an 
incentive to secure a hare rather than waiting to hunt a stag, in the absence of trust, each 
will fear that the other will betray him. In this case, each will behave in a rational manner 
and defect. The outcome in this case is that both will have a hare and therefore a less 
payoff when compared to a share of stag. The absence of trust weakens the coalition 
between the two hunters though it is clear that it is better for both if they cooperate. 
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 On the other hand, if trust is present, it eliminates any fears of betrayal even if 
they don’t know each other preferences. It acts like a binding agreement that strengthens 
and supports the coalition between the two. The stronger is the trust, the stronger is the 
coalition. Each will sacrifice a chance for a hunting a hare (secured gain) for a more 
rewarding share for both. Any short term benefits gained from betraying the other will 
result in a long term loss in any future interaction. In such repeated encounters, building a 
good reputation is crucial for future long lasting benefits.  
 
 
Table 6.8: Stag hunt stability analysis using different solution concepts. 
Solution 
Concept State Player 1 Player 2 Equilibria 
SS S S E 
SH U U  
HS U U  
Nash 
HH S S E 
SS S S E 
SH U U  
HS U U  
GMR 
HH S S E 
SS S S E 
SH U U  
HS U U  
SMR 
HH S S E 
SS S S E 
SH U U  
HS U U  
SEQ 









6.6 Groundwater Contamination Conflict  
Recalling the groundwater contamination conflict presented and solved in section 4.2, the 
equiliberia states are 1, 4, 5, 8, and 9. While state 1 represents the status quo and state 9 
represents the worst case scenario, the remaining states (4, 5, and 8) lies somewhere in 
between. While some of the equilibrium states are more preferred than others, the 
possibility of one of them occurring depends on the strategy choices by some or all the 
players involved. It might be in the interest of some of the players to cooperate and 
together move to a more preferred equilibrium state given that this move is not 
sanctioned by a move levied by a non-coalition member. This may require some of the 
coalition members to move to an intermediate state that might not be preferred when 
compared to the current state by some of the players. This entitles some risks and fear of 
betrayal.   
 States 5 and 8 are more preferred by all players to state 9. State 8 is more 
preferred by both MoE and UR to state 5. It is not possible for any of them to move from 
state 5 to state 8 on an individual basis. In order to do so, UR needs to move first to state 
7, which is less preferred by UR, and, subsequently, MoE can move from state 7 to state 
8.  In case MoE doesn’t move to state 8, UR will end up in a less preferred situation and 
might need to abandon its entire operations in Elmira.   
 Table 6.9 shows the evolution of the Elmira conflict from the status quo, to a 
transitional non-cooperative equilibrium and ultimately to a final cooperative coalition 
equilibrium. The status quo is state number 1 which is the most preferred state for UR but 
less preferred by both MoE and LG. As indicated by the arrow connecting states 1 and 5 
in Table 6.9, LG can unilaterally cause the conflict to move from state 1 to 5 by changing 
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its strategy from not insisting that the original be adopted to insisting that it be applied. In 
fact, because LG prefers state 5 to 1 (see the third row in Table 4.3 in section 4.2), this 
change in state constitutes a unilateral improvement for LG. Though state number 5 is not 
the most preferred for both MoE and LG, it is still more preferred than state number 1. 
From state number 5, it is not possible for any player to improve unilaterally. In order to 
move from state 5 to state 8, two players need to move together (MoE and UR). This 
requires moving to an intermediate state; either 6 or 7. If MoE initiates the move, then the 
intermediate state is 6. Since state 6 is less preferred by UR compared to state 8, it is 
natural that UR wants to move jointly with MoE to directly reach state 8. If UR initiates 
the move from state 5, then the intermediate state is state 7 which is the most preferred 
state for MoE. Accordingly, for the coalition consisting of MoE and UR to jointly 
improve from state 5 to 8, the decision makers must trust one another. 
 As explained above, if UR moves from state 5 without the participation of MoE, 
the less preferred state 7 will be formed, which happens to be MoE’s most preferred state. 
Hence, MoE has an incentive to remain at state 7 if it fools UR into trustingly moving to 
state 7. If it does not wish to abuse the trust required of UR, it will remain in the coalition 
and select its strategy such that state 8 is reached. Of course, both MoE and UR prefers 

















MoE: 1. Modify N N  Y  
UR:    2. Delay Y Y  N  
3. Accept N N  Y  
4. Abandon N N N 
LG:   5. Insist N  Y  Y 
State Number 1 5 8 
 
 In the foregoing situation, both MoE and UR have an incentive not to carry out 
their obligations and move the coalition from the intermediate state 5 to the final state. 
Only if there is a minimum level of trust, will each execute their obligations and sacrifice 
individual benefits for a more preferred one by both (but might be less preferred for one 
when compared to the intermediate state). UR needs to calculate the trust index for both 
MoE and LG to ascertain if it worth forming a coalition with any of them. To calculate 
the trust index between UR and MoE, using the information in Table 6.10 and employing 
Equation 6.5, one obtains the fuzzy values for main criteria as follows: 
Information = (0.371, 0.568, 0.845, 1.240) 
Circumstances = (0.460, 0.650, 0.862, 1.130) 






Table 6.10: Trust index for UR with MoE. 
Criteria Sub-Criteria Fuzzy Values Fuzzy Weights 
Information   (0.9, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0; 1.0) 
 Risk (0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9; 1.0) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0; 1.0) 
 Uncertainty (0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9; 1.0) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0; 1.0) 
 Dependence (0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7; 1.0) (0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8; 1.0) 
 Reputation 0 0 
Circumstances   (0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0; 1.0) 
 Importance (0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9; 1.0) (0.9, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0; 1.0) 
 Value (0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7 1.0) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0; 1.0) 
 Alternatives (0.8, 0.9, 1.0, 1.0; 1.0) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0; 1.0) 
 Deadlines 0 0 
Judgment   (0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8; 1.0) 
 Attractiveness (0.8, 0.9, 1.0, 1.0; 1.0) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0; 1.0) 
 Actions & 
Statements 
  




Computing the Fuzzy Weighted Average using Equation 6.5, one obtains: FWA = (0.325, 
0.598, 1.062, 1.810). Employing equations 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, and 6.11, the COG (FWA) = 
(0.976, .038) and the base S = 1.48. According to Equation 6.10, one can see that values 
of ),,( lowR SSB  ),,( lowfairlyR SSB −  ),,( mediumR SSB  ),,( highfairlyR SSB −  and ( , )R highB S S  are all 
equal to 1. Based on Equation 6.9, the degree of similarity between the Fuzzy Weighted 
Average (FWA) and the five-member linguistic terms are: 
),( lowRS = 0.035. 
),( lowfairlyRS − = 0.149. 
),( mediumRS  = 0.321. 
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),( highfairlyRS − = 0.470. 
),( highRS  = 0.413.   
 From these calculations, one concludes that the trust index between UR and MoE 
is Fairly High. 
 To calculate the trust index between UR and LG, using the information in Table 
6.11 and employing Equation 6.5, one obtains the fuzzy values for main criteria as 
follows: 
Information = (0.307, 0.488, 0.745, 1.120) 
Circumstances = (0.260, 0.407, 0.577, 0.826) 
Judgment = (0.140, 0.267, 0.450, 0.714) 
Computing the Fuzzy Weighted Average using Equation 6.5, one obtain: FWA = (0.165, 
0.344, 0.665, 1.265). Employing equations 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, and 6.11, the COG (FWA) = 
(0.635, .382) and the base S = 1.10. According to Equation 6.10, one can see that values 
of ),,( lowR SSB  ),,( lowfairlyR SSB −  ),,( mediumR SSB  ),,( highfairlyR SSB −  and ( , )R highB S S  are all 
equal to 1. Based on Equation 6.9, the degree of similarity between the Fuzzy Weighted 
Average (FWA) and the five-member linguistic terms are: 
),( lowRS = 0.273. 
),( lowfairlyRS − = 0.508. 
),( mediumRS  = 0.670. 
),( highfairlyRS − = 0.588. 
),( highRS  = 0.376.   




Table 6.11: Trust index for UR with LG. 
Criteria Sub-Criteria Fuzzy Values Fuzzy Weights 
Information   (0.9, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0; 1.0) 
 Risk (0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7; 1.0) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0; 1.0) 
 Uncertainty (0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7; 1.0) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0; 1.0) 
 Dependence (0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9; 1.0) (0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8; 1.0) 
 Reputation 0 0 
Circumstances   (0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0; 1.0) 
 Importance (0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7; 1.0) (0.9, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0; 1.0) 
 Value (0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7 1.0) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0; 1.0) 
 Alternatives (0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5; 1.0) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0; 1.0) 
 Deadlines 0 0 
Judgment   (0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8; 1.0) 
 Attractiveness (0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5; 1.0) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0; 1.0) 
 Actions & 
Statements 
0 0 




 Given the preferences for each decision maker and by comparing the two trust 
indices, one can envision UR trusting MoE and, hence, forming a coalition with MoE is 
more promising than forming a one with the LG. 
In reality, UR formed a coalition with MoE and accepted the Control Order and at the 
same time the MoE modified it to be more favorable to UR though such an action is not 
accepted by the local government. This coalition between MoE and UR caused the game 




The foregoing analysis for the stag hunt and the groundwater contamination conflict 
show the effectiveness of the fuzzy approach in modeling trust characteristics of DMs 
that other approaches fail to accomplish on their own. More specifically, the fuzzy 
approach to trust complements and strengthens the arguments that solution concepts may 
suggest as to when it is in DMs’ interests to form coalitions in order to benefit coalition 
members. For example, even though all coalition members may fare better within a 
coalition, one or more coalition members may still be tempted to act independently 
because they think they may gain even more if they behave selfishly. The famous stag 
hunt dilemma and the realworld environmental conflict were employed to illustrate and 
explain how trust can provide useful insights about human behavior under conflict.  
 The fuzzy approach to trust adds a more realistic dimension to the study of 
conflict by capturing how the DMs would think and behave in a situation in which a 
decision to cooperate is to be made. It also shows the strong relationship between trust 
and cooperative actions and how one’s strategy choices change when realizing the fact 
that one is being trusted or trusting the other party. Generally speaking, one could say 
that the presence of complete distrust will eliminate any chance for cooperation. In the 
Elmira Conflict, the idea of coalition analysis gives a partial answer to the question of 
whether to cooperate or not. While the coalition analysis highlights the possible 
improvements by forming a coalition, it doesn’t give a full answer on how and why the 
coalition will form nor which coalitions take place. Through the use of the fuzzy 
approach and the introduction of the concept of trust among coalition members, this 
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research provides an answer to these questions. Chapter 7 concludes by summarizing the 



































Conclusions and Future Research 
The introduction of the new fuzzy preference representation extends the applicability of 
the graph model for conflict resolution to areas that were not previously attainable. The 
introduction of the trust concepts and modeling could help understand, assess, and 
evaluate the feasibility of forming a coalition in order to improve to a more preferred 
equilibria that couldn’t be reached unilaterally by a single DM. 
 The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution is an intuitive, flexible, and at the same 
time efficient paradigm for modeling and analyzing strategic conflict (Kilgour et al., 
2001; Fang et al., 1993). However, until now it didn’t take into consideration preference 
uncertainties. Additionally, when the trust research in this thesis is utilized, the graph 
model methodology is now able to explain why coalitions form and which ones are most 
likely to take place in practice. 
 
7.1 Summary of Contributions 
In real life, the actions and choices by others are anything but certain. One expects people 
to act or behave in a certain way but, in reality they are free agents who may not behave 
according to others’ expectations. Incorporating the concept of uncertainty into the Graph 
Model for Conflict Resolution will help account for those uncertainties. The key 
contributions of this research are to introduce a fuzzy modeling of preference 
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uncertainties and trust within the graph model and show how the presence of trust affects 
DMs’ choices in cooperative games. Those key research contributions are shown in 
Figure 7.1.   
 
 
Figure 7.1: Major research contributions of the thesis. 
 
 In conflicts between just two participants, one only needs to worry about possible 
countermoves by the opponent depending on the solution concept under investigation. 
Chapter three introduces the concept of fuzzy preferences. The concepts of unilateral 
moves and unilateral improvements are modified in accordance with the new fuzzy 
preferences. The four solution concepts of Nash, general metarationality, symmetric 
metarationality, and sequential stability are redefined to accommodate fuzziness in 
preferences.  One important distinction between the newly defined solution concepts and 
the regular ones is that the strength of Nash stability, for which there are no UIs, is 
defined based on the strength of the preference. The interrelationships among the 
different concepts are highlighted in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5, the concept of the fuzzy 
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binary relationship is introduced and the relationship between the fuzzy and non-fuzzy 
preferences is examined afterwards. To show the applicability of the newly proposed 
fuzzy preference representation, the well-known game of Prisoner’s Dilemma is 
examined from a fuzzy perspective for both the ordinal and cardinal cases. 
   The newly introduced solution concepts in Chapter 3 are generalized for when 
there are more than two DMs in Chapter 4. This requires examining all possible moves 
and countermoves by all the sanctioning DMs which calls for defining them as a 
sequence of allowable moves rather than a single one. The groundwater contamination 
conflict is employed to show how the new solution concepts for multiple participants are 
applied in practice. 
 Upon reaching euqilibria or a conflict resolution, it might be in the best interests 
of some of the DMs to form a coalition and move together to a better cooperative 
equilibrium which is not attainable on an individual basis. However, this may involve 
some risks as the new coalition might require some of its members to move to an 
intermediate state that might be less preferred by some members while more preferred by 
others when compared to the original or the final states. Only the presence of some 
minimum level of trust will eliminate any fears of betrayal and ensure all the coalition 
members that each and every one will fulfill his or her obligations towards reaching the 
final goal of the coalition. 
 To enhance the understanding of the concept of trust and help to better model it, 
Chapter 5 starts with a thorough study and assessment of trust among different 
disciplines. This study explores how the different disciplines envision trust differently 
and why.  Current issues with the current methods for trust assessment and modeling 
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have been highlighted. This research calls for developing a general data test set besides 
agreeing on a general testing framework for trust. 
 Chapter 6 proposes a fuzzy structure for modeling trust in order to capture as 
much as possible the trust dynamics and multidimensionality. It is simple, intuitive, and 
uses linguistic terms that are easy to express and understand. This enables humans and 
agents involved in conflicts or cooperative actions to evaluate the trustworthiness of 
others before engaging with them in an interaction.  As a representative generic game for 
so many real life encounters, the game of stag hunt was employed to demonstrate the 
applicability of the proposed modeling for two-DM disputes. Between the fear of the 
worst and the hope for the best, the aquifer water contamination conflict represents an 
ideal situation for applying the trust methodology for conflicts having more than 2 DMs.    
 
7.2 Future Research 
Despite the theoretical advances of introducing the concept of the preference 
uncertainties in Graph Model for Conflict Resolution for both 2 and n-DM cases, there 
are some promising issues that need to be investigated further:  
• The current version of the decision support system GMCR II doesn’t take into 
consideration any preference uncertainties. Implementing the new fuzzy 
representation within the framework of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution 
will extend the applicability of the system. 
• It is worth investigating the applicability of the new fuzzy preference 
representation in other solution concepts such as limited-move stability. 
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• Currently, it is assumed that all factors shown in Figure 6.1 contribute equally to 
trust. In fact, this might not be true. Some factors, which are considered important 
issues to trust, may in fact contribute less to trust.  
• Another issue is the interaction among the different factors. Some factors might 
be influential to others but do not directly affect trust while others might have a 
direct impact on the value of trust. A well-designed survey or empirical study and 
the employment of some stochastic analysis, multivariate inference, or hybrid 
fuzzy stochastic models are needed to further highlight relationships among the 
different factors and show which ones contribute more to trust, and whether or not 
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